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INTRODUCTION

Warren McCleskey is one of the more than 1600 death row
inmates in the United States.' A Georgia court sentenced him to
death for the felony murder of a white policeman during the course of
1. Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1670, 1672 (1986). Almost half of the people on death row in America are in the six states that
comprise the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 27, 121 n.262 (1984).
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an armed robbery in 1978.2 McCleskey lost on appeal to the Supreme
Court of Georgia,' and the Supreme Court of the United States
denied his petition for certiorari. 4 In his federal action for habeas
corpus relief, he introduced evidence that, at the time he was sentenced, convicted killers of white victims in Georgia were more than
twice as likely to receive the death penalty than were convicted killers
of black victims.' He derived this evidence from a comprehensive,
sophisticated statistical study of the results of Georgia's death-sentencing system for the years 1973-79.6 The study's findings indicated
that murderers of white victims, whose crimes, like McCleskey's,
were in the "mid-range" of statutory aggravating circumstances, were
2.4 times more likely to receive death sentences than were defendants
convicted of comparably aggravated murders of black victims.7 This
disparity, McCleskey argues, proves that there was an impermissible
risk that the race of his victim was a "silent aggravating circumstance" in his sentencing jury's decision to impose the death penalty.8
Consequently, McCleskey argues that the Georgia death penalty
statute is arbitrarily and capriciously applied, in violation of the
eighth amendment. 9 McCleskey argues also that killers of white victims are themselves victims of a fourteenth amendment equal protection violation, because sentencing otherwise similarly situated
defendants to death on the basis of race is constitutionally impermissible."° The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, denied McCleskey's eighth and fourteenth amendment claims. " Relying upon circuit precedent of dubious validity, the
court held that McCleskey was required to prove discriminatory
intent as an element of his eighth amendment challenge.' 2 The court
then concluded that even if McCleskey's evidence proved discriminatory sentencing results, it did not compel an inference of discriminatory intent, without which eighth amendment and equal protection
2. In addition to the murder conviction, McCleskey was convicted of two counts of
armed robbery. McClesky v. State, 245 Ga. 108, 263 S.E.2d 146, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891
(1980). On the robbery convictions, he was sentenced to two consecutive life terms. Id.
3. Id.
4. McCleskey v. Georgia, 449 U.S. 891 (1980).
5. See infra notes 365-68 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 335.
7. See infra notes 369-70 and accompanying text.
8. Brief for Petitioner at 35, McCleskey (No. 84-6811).
9. See infra notes 21-90 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 117-65 and accompanying text. McCleskey raised other claims of
constitutional defects in his sentence which this Comment will not address.
11. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 890-92 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
3331 (1986).
12. See infra notes 62-87 and accompanying text.
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claims must fail. 13 The court, nonetheless, devoted much of its opinion to attempts to trivialize and discredit McCleskey's evidence, misreading the statistics, and misleading the reader. 4 This Comment
endeavors to explain why the Eleventh Circuit erected arguably
unprecedented and perhaps insurmountable doctrinal and evidentiary barriers to the vindication of McCleskey's claims.
This case epitomizes the problems that inhere in a capital sentencing system created and administered by human beings. Although
the Supreme Court's decisions require that there be some degree of
discretion in the capital sentencing process to eliminate unfairness,
discretion necessarily permits arbitrariness. 5 The Court's treatment
of discretion may have created a doctrinal quagmire from which there
is no escape. The Court has rejected both unlimited discretion,' 6 and
mandatory death sentencing which permits no discretion. 7 Upon its
certiorari review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case, 8 the
Court may be compelled to declare that some arbitrariness, born of
"permissible" levels of human discretion, is constitutionally tolerable.
A contrary decision might be the functional equivalent of abolishing the death penalty. Some fear, and others hope, that McCleskey's evidence of Georgia's preference for avenging white victims will
compel a rational Court to conclude that Georgians' unspoken racial
animus frustrates, and always will frustrate, the constitutional administration of a facially constitutional death-sentencing statute. This is a
wrong that arguably cannot be remedied except by shutting down
Georgia's power to execute anyone. Thus, McCleskey's argument is a
brilliant, yet problematic attempt to circumvent the Supreme Court's
long-held majority view that the death penalty is not per se cruel and
unusual.' 9 Further, this case illustrates the impotence of an equal
protection remedy that is available only upon proof of specific discriminatory intent. 20 Even a cursory glance at McCleskey's evidence
strongly suggests that something is rotten in Georgia. A realistic
investigation of the system might show that, as a society, we are incapable of administering the death sentence without considering the
unconstitutional factor of race. To preserve the death penalty, the
Justices of the Supreme Court may be forced to avert their eyes.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
See infra notes 357-75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
Id.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986) (granting certiorari).
See infra note 30.
See infra notes 67-69, 155 and accompanying text.
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THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

It is, by now, axiomatic that the arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty violates the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.2 ' Accordingly, McCleskey argued that the
Georgia capital sentencing system, by its arbitrary enforcement,
deprived him of his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unu22
sual punishment.
After examining McCleskey's evidence, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that even if the statistical proof were valid, it was insufficient to substantiate his claim. 23 In so doing, the court ignored the
data upon which the statistical proof was based and which, of itself,
raised a strong inference that the Georgia sentencing system was not
constitutionally sound.24 Moreover, the court rejected McCleskey's
claim because he had not proved that state actors had intentionally
applied the Georgia capital sentencing statute 25 so as to violate his
eighth amendment rights. The court reasoned that McCleskey's statistical evidence did not establish sufficient disparate racial impact to
necessitate the inference that the state had intentionally discriminated
against him. 26 The court, however, incorrectly and improperly
required McCleskey to prove intent as an element of his eighth
amendment sentencing challenge.27
21. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). The Court in Furman stated
simply that the imposition of the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in
the murder case and the two rape cases before it. Id. at 240. Concurring opinions, however,

identified the element of arbitrariness in sentencing as the reason behind the Court's decision.
Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 274-76 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring). The Court later stated, "In Furman [this] Court held that the
penalty of death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create substantial risk
that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980). For an historical and philosophical analysis of the eighth
amendment, see Comment, Constitutional Law: The Death Penalty: A Critique of the

PhilosophicalBases Held to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment Requirements for Its Justification,
34 OKLA. L. REV. 567 (1981).

22. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 885 (11th Cir. 1985), cert.granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331
(1986).
23. Id. at 895-98. For a discussion of McCleskey's statistical evidence, see infra notes 33575 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text.
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982).

26. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 894.
27. See infra notes 63-87 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has imposed a state

of mind requirement for a damagesclaim under the eighth amendment. See Whitley v. Albers,
106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986) ("wantonness" requirement); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97

(1976) ("deliberate indifference"). The Court has not imposed, however, a similar requirement
for sentencing challenges. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (Stewart,
Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (eighth amendment prohibits the unnecessary infliction of

pain). It may be that the Court is more receptive to capital defendants simply because they
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A.

Background: "Cruel and Unusual" Punishment

The cruel and unusual punishment clause2 8 originated in the
English Bill of Rights.2 9 Historians and the Court have generally
accepted that the Framers of the eighth amendment did not intend to

include the death penalty within the scope of prohibited cruel and
unusual punishment.30 Over time, as the courts faced diverse claims
of cruel and unusual punishment, the scope of the clause gradually
expanded. 3 Long before McCleskey first appeared in federal district
raise the eighth amendment as a shield to prevent a violation, whereas prisoners seeking
damages in less severe contexts raise the amendment as a sword to vindicate a past injury. The
Court's failure to articulate the reason for this distinction also suggests that it has never viewed
the imposition of such a requirement as worthy of consideration. The Court has
acknowledged "that. the death sentence is different from all other sentences, and therefore
special care is exercised in judicial review." Sullivan v. Wainwright, 464 U.S. 109, 112 (1983)
(per curiam).
For a description of the "process model," which the Court has erected to protect the
rights of those who might be sentenced to death, see Hubbard, "Reasonable Levels of
Arbitrariness" in Death Sentencing Patterns: A Tragic Perspective on Capital Punishment, 18
U.C. DAvis. L. REV. 1113, 1114-64 (1985).
28. The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
29. The English Bill of Rights, enacted December 16, 1689, stated that "feixcessive bail
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243 n.3 (1972) (quoting Bill of Rights, 1688, 1
W. & M., Sess. 2, ch. 2). But see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual PunishmentsInflicted."
The OriginalMeaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 843 (1969) (tracing history of the clause and
arguing that Congress misunderstood the use of the clause in England).
30. It is generally agreed that the Framers of the Constitution approved of the death
penalty when justly implemented. This agreement is based in part on the command of the fifth
amendment, which was ratified contemporaneously with the eighth amendment. Furman, 408
U.S. at 419 (Powell, J., dissenting). The fifth amendment implicitly permits the government to
impose the death penalty only so long as it adheres to due process guidelines. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V ("nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law"). Inasmuch as no constitutional provision should be read so as to eviscerate
another, one may argue that the eighth amendment does not prohibit that which the fifth
amendment purports to allow.
31. The Court's first occasion to refer to the clause occurred eighty years after its
enactment. See Pevear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 479-80 (1867), cited in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). During this early
period, courts conducted a retrospective eighth amendment analysis. In order for a penalty to
rise to the level of an eighth amendment violation, a litigant had to show that the Framers
themselves would have regarded it as cruel and unusual. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 265 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). In time, this historical approach gave way to a
more flexible interpretation of the clause, in which contemporaneous moral and jurisprudential
considerations became determinative. In Weems v. United States, the Court rejected a strictly
historical approach to the interpretation of the clause. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Court
acknowledged that the eighth amendment's "restraint upon legislatures" possesses an
"expansive and vital character" which is "essential ... to the rule of law and the maintenance
of individual freedom." Id. at 376-77. The Weems Court stated further that the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Id. at 378.
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court, the Supreme Court rejected several different types of penalties
32
under the "cruel and unusual" rubric.
In the 1960's, our society witnessed a vigorous attack on the
death penalty by a coalition of death penalty abolitionists and the
NAACP, which fought the battle from a racial discrimination perspective. 3 In 1972, the Court finally bridged the conceptual chasm
between torture, a "substantively" cruel and unusual punishment, and
an arbitrary death sentence, a "procedurally" cruel and unusual punishment, in Furman v. Georgia.3 4 Despite the brief interlude during
which the Court struck down state death penalty statutes because of
arbitrary sentencing practices,35 the present Court prefers to spare the
rhetoric and save the penalty. 6
32. First, the Court held that the clause prohibited only outright torture and physical
cruelty. See In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1880) (electrocution held constitutional);
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (execution by firing squad in public held constitutional).
Later, the Court banned excessive or disproportionate penalties. See Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349 (1910). The Weems Court held, under the cruel and unusual punishment clause,
that to punish a forger with fifteen years of hard labor in chains was "cruel and in excess." Id.
at 377. Justice Brennan more recently commented on the concept of excessiveness:
The final principle inherent in the Clause is that a severe punishment must not be
excessive. A punishment is excessive under this principle if it is unnecessary:
The infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport with human
dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless infliction of suffering.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 279 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
In modern times, the Court has concluded that a penalty offending society's evolving
standards of decency is cruel when society perceives it as cruel. In Trop v. Dulles, the Court
stated that the cruel and unusual punishment clause "must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
Certain punishments, such as torture, are cruel and unusual because they are offensive to the
"dignity of man," irrespective of public acceptance of these punishments. "The basic concept
underlying the [clause] is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power
to punish, the [clause] stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." Id. at 100.
Finally, in Furman, the Court held that, although the death penalty was not per se cruel
and unusual, the eighth amendment prohibited its imposition in an arbitrary, capricious, and
unevenhanded manner. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40. There is no definitive list of punishments
which the Court deems cruel and unusual. The evolving nature of the clause means new types
of punishments could be added to this list in the future.
33. See generally M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL-THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1973).
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In a five-to-four, per curiam decision, the Furman Court rejected
unguided capital sentencing. The Court held that the penalty of death in the three cases before
it constituted cruel and unusual punishment, thus violating the eighth amendment. Id. at 23940.
35. Furman v. Georgia represents the Court's first rejection of arbitrariness in sentencing.
408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court accepted a guided
discretionary death penalty sentencing system as correcting that problem. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
36. For the proposition that the Court has since modified the position it had taken in
Furman, see California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (The eighth and fourteenth
amendments neither require nor prohibit an instruction regarding the Governor's power to
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In Furman, the Supreme Court made it clear that permitting
unbridled arbitrariness to taint the sentencing process contravenes the
eighth amendment." 7 In so holding, the Court radically departed
from the position it had taken only one year earlier in McGautha v.
California.38 Although the eighth amendment was not at issue in
McGautha,3 9 the Court specifically condoned the "untrammeled dis-

cretion" of the jury in the death sentencing process.4" It rejected the
argument that a sentencer was capable of exercising discretion
according to articulable, objective standards. 4 In Furman, however,
the Court seemingly reversed its prior acceptance of arbitrariness in
death penalty sentencing.42
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's opinions since Furman appear
to recognize limitations on the Court's ability to eradicate arbitrariness from death sentencing. Four years after Furman, in Gregg v.
Georgia,4 3 the Court noted that a minimal amount of discretion in the

application of a death sentencing system was unavoidable." Analogously, the concurring Justices stated that "discretion must be suitably . . . limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action. ' 45 Later, in Godfrey v. Georgia,4 6 the Court

retracted further from its Furman posture and held that "death may
not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create substantial
risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner."47

Since the sixties and early seventies, judicial and national atticommute a life sentence.); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (upholding a death
sentence, even though the state trial court's consideration of the defendant's criminal record as
an aggravating circumstance was improper under state law); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862
(1983) (The Constitution does not require a state to adopt specific standards to instruct a jury
in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the death penalty.).
37. Furman, 408 U.S. at 293 (1972).
38. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
39. In McGautha, the Court considered a challenge to California's capital punishment
system under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court rejected as

illusory the concept of guided discretionary sentencing. It reasoned that past efforts to
identify, "before the fact," cases in which the penalty should be imposed, had been "uniformly
unsuccessful." Id. at 197.

40. Id. at 207-08.
41. Id.

42. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

44. Id. at 192.
45. Id. at 189 (emphasis added) (Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring). Moreover,
the Gregg Court concluded that to accept the argument that the system operated arbitrarily
after post-Furman reforms would be to place "totally unrealistic conditions"
implementation of capital punishment. Id. at 198-200.
46. 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 427 (emphasis added).

on the
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tudes have shifted in favor of capital punishment.4 8 Contemporary
death sentencing legislation reflecting such an attitude shift, however,
must not exceed the constitutional boundaries which the Court drew
in Furman: Death penalty statutes must not be arbitrary and capricious, but rather, must be consistent and rational in their application.4 9 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not succeeded in
48. Bedau, Gregg v. Georgia and the "New" Death Penalty, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
Summer/Fall 1985, at 1, 3 (general public approves of death penalty by wide margin).
The Court's willingness to tolerate some arbitrariness may reflect a belief that such
arbitrariness is a reasonable societal cost in exchange for the societal benefits associated with
the death penalty, such as retribution and deterrence. Apparently, the presumed retributive
component of the penalty has become increasingly appealing. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 394-96
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that retribution and deterrence are appropriate aims of the
death penalty); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (Retribution is neither "a forbidden objective
nor one inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of men."); cf. Furman, 408 U.S. at 453-54
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("While retribution alone may seem an unworthy justification in a
moral sense, its utility in a system of criminal justice requiring public support has long been
recognized."). In part, capital punishment is a means of expressing society's moral outrage at
particularly offensive conduct. Retributionalists argue that it is essential that citizens be able
to rely on the legal process rather than on self-help to vindicate their rights. Furman, 408 U.S.
at 308 ("When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose
upon criminal offenders the punishment they 'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of
anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch law.").
Courts recognize that the death penalty offers an additional, although perhaps less
significant, societal benefit: incapacitation of the criminal. In effect, the penalty absolutely
guarantees that the criminal will not perpetrate another crime in the future. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 183 n.28; Furman, 408 U.S. at 301 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 355 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
Although courts that uphold death penalty statutes and sentencing systems may be partly
reflecting public opinion, one may argue that fundamental constitutional principles that
proscribe judicial intervention in this context mandate the same result. Death penalty
advocates may invoke the separation of powers doctrine to prohibit judicial interference into
the establishment of criminal penalties-essentially a legislative function. See, e.g., Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 119-20 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175
(Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Courts are not democratic bodies and, therefore, are not
well-suited to make policy decisions.)).
Similarly, notions of federalism counsel that no branch of thefederal government involve
itself in matters primarily of state concern. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 104, 128 (1982)
(cautioning against liberal grants of federal habeas corpus relief because criminal law is
primarily within the domain of state government); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
344 (4th ed. 1983) (granting fedral habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner affronts state
judges). But see generally Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the
Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984) (criticizing judicial abstention doctrines which
courts invoke to avoid addressing state intrusions into civil rights and other areas).
49. Significantly, some commentators assert that arbitrariness and discrimination still
infect the Georgia capital sentencing system, despite the Court's position in Furman. See
Bedau, supra note 48, at 10-12 (arguing that Gregg, a compromise decision, was based on
faulty reasoning); Bentele, The Death Penalty in Georgia: Still Arbitrary, 62 WASH. U.L.Q.
573, 579-82 (1985) (concluding that discrimination stills occurs after an aggravating factor has
been identified, rather than at the outset of the sentencing process, as was the case in Furman);
Bowers, The Persuasiveness of Arbitrarinessand Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital
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creating a standard by which either to measure the arbitrariness
inherent in a sentencing system, or to determine whether that arbitrariness rises to constitutionally unacceptable levels.5 °
Significantly, although the Court in Furman condemned the free
reign of discretion, it has since condemned the complete absence of
discretion in capital sentencing systems as well. Several states had
responded to Furman by enacting systems that required the imposition of the penalty for certain crimes, thereby completely eliminating
sentencing discretion. 5 The Court rejected this approach in Woodson
v. North Carolina52 and Roberts v. Louisiana.5 3 Georgia's present
capital sentencing system 4 thus represents an attempt to afford a constitutionally permissible quantum of discretion, or to locate a point
along the continuum of discretion sentencing that exists between the
extremes of Furman and Woodson.
Four years after Furman's rejection of totally discretionary sentencing, the Court approved a system allowing sentencers to exercise
Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1070 (1983) ("To the extent that such reforms
are effective at one point in the process, they may simply shift or displace arbitrariness to other
points in the process."); Rabkin, Justice and Judicial Hand-Wringing: The Death Penalty
Since Gregg, 4 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 18, 18-29 (1985) (arguing that the Court was neither
willing to follow through with its analysis in Furman, nor willing to reject it). But cf Note,
Distinguishing Among Murders When Assessing the Proportionality of the Death Penalty, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1786-1807 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court will not uphold a statute
allowing the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty).
50. The Court was unable to discern a logical explanation as to why the Georgia jury had

chosen to execute the three convicted criminal petitioners, while defendants convicted of
similar crimes had received life sentences. Furman, 408 U.S. at 249-53 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
51. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The Woodson Court supported
the rejection of mandatory capital sentencing by noting that legislatures and courts had been
engaged in a two hundred year struggle to effect death penalty justice. Id. at 289-301. Over
time, reforms limited the number of crimes subject to the death penalty and gave juries
discretion in choosing between life and death for first-degree offenders. Id. at 289-92. There
were two primary rationales for such changes. First, the evolving public conscience came to
demand a more humane and contained system for the infliction of punishment. Id. at 295-96.
Second, the court characterized these reforms as a legislative effort to prevent jury
nullification, that is, finding defendants not guilty in order to avoid harsh mandatory sentences
associated with certain crimes. Id. at 293. These two concerns motivated the Court's rejection
of mandatory death penalties. See id. at 302-05; see also BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA
1-30 (1974) (noting that the reluctance of jurors to impose the death sentence may result in its
abandonment).
52. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
53. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). The Court held Louisiana's mandatory death sentence statute
unconstitutional. The Louisiana Legislature had attempted to mitigate the harshness of a
mandatory capital punishment system by implementing a narrow definition of first-degree
murder. The Court held that this was an inadequate response to the inflexibility of the
sentencing statute. Id. at 331-36.
54. GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982). See infra note 58.
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"guided discretion."5 5 In Gregg v. Georgia,5 6 the Court found that the

Georgia sentencing statute was consonant with the spirit of Furman.
The carefully drafted statute provided for a bifurcated sentencing procedure57 and required the sentencer to consider a list of aggravating
circumstances.5 8 In order to impose the death penalty, the sentencer

had to find that one or more of these aggravating circumstances
inhered with respect to the defendant or his crime.
55. A guided discretion system limits the sentencer's range of discretion so as to force him
to focus upon appropriate facts in rendering a sentence. By enumerating aggravating and
mitigating factors, which must be considered before a death sentence is appropriate, states
have attempted to eliminate the consideration of impermissible factors, such as race. See
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192-95, 206-07; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976).
56. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
57. A bifurcated procedure splits the trial into two parts. The first part contemplates the
determination of guilt or innocence-the "guilt trial." The second part allows for the
determination of the penalty. This split procedure allows the jury to hear additional
information as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances that would be inadmissible as
proof of guilt, but which a sentencer legitimately may consider in sentencing. See Gregg, 428
U.S. at 162-64, 190-91.
58. The current Georgia statute provides as follows:
17-10-30. Procedure for imposition of death penalty generally.
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft hijacking
or treason in any case.
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be
authorized, the judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the
jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravating
circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the following statutory
aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony;
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another
capital felony or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in
the first degree;
(3) The offender, by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping,
knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public
place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous
to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or
another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary
value;
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district
attorney or solicitor, or former district attorney or solicitor was committed
during or because of the exercise of his official duties;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or
committed murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim;
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer,
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The only occasion on which the Court disapproved of a guideddiscretion system was in Godfrey v. Georgia. 9 Although Georgia had
attempted to solve the discretion problem by establishing a system of
aggravating circumstances, the Court viewed one of Georgia's statutory aggravating circumstances as permitting the exercise of open-

ended arbitrariness in sentencing. 6° The Court, therefore, held the
statute as applied to be void for vagueness under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.6 '
B.

The Eleventh Circuit's Intent Requirement

McCleskey argued that, in view of Georgia's history of racial
prejudice and the statistical evidence of discriminatory impact, the
Georgia sentencing system was arbitrary because it allowed too much
discretion to juries in the sentencing stage of the criminal process.62
correction employee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his
official duties;
(9) The offense was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement; or
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding,
interfering with, or preventing the lawful arrest or custody in a place of
lawful confinement, of himself or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be
warranted by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for
its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall
designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating
circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In
nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of treason
or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in subsection (b) of this Code is so found, the death penalty shall not
be imposed.
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (1982).
The Court upheld two other systems of guided discretion the same year it upheld Georgia's system in Gregg. The Court approved Florida's system of weighing aggravating versus
mitigating circumstances in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). See FLA. STAT. § 921.141
(1977). The Court also affirmed the constitutionality of the Texas sentencing system in Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). In the Texas system, once the jury finds that the statutory
aggravating circumstances were present, it is compelled to sentence the defendant to death.
See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
The system presently operating in Georgia, and the one upon which McCleskey based his
claim, allows more discretion than either the Florida or Texas systems. For a detailed analysis
and comparison of the various guided discretion systems that states adopted in the wake of
Furman, see Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrarinessand Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital
Statutes, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 565-68 (1980).
59. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
60. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432 (statutory provision allowing death penalty for commission of
"outrageously and wantonly vile" crime held unconstitutionally vague).
61. Id.
62. In his brief, the petitioner argued that the Court should consider Georgia's long
history of racial discrimination as circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent. Although
this argument seems more appropriate with respect to McCleskey's equal protection claim, the
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This argument did not convince the Eleventh Circuit. The court
improperly evaluated McCleskey's eighth amendment claim of arbitrariness under the intent analysis that normally arises in the equal
protection context.6 3 The court thus treated McCleskey's distinct
eighth and fourteenth amendment challenges as a generic constitutional claim of racism,6 4 and then rejected it as such.65
If this means that discriminatory intent must be proved, then the
Eleventh Circuit, in effect, has closed the courtroom door to those
who claim systemic discrimination. The intent requirement appears
especially inappropriate to the type of issue McCleskey presented.
McCleskey did not allege, and probably could not prove, purposeful
discrimination by any specific actor in the Georgia capital sentencing
system. Instead, McCleskey argued that the system was functioning
in a manner that produced discriminatory results, and thus violated
his eighth amendment right to have his penalty determined in a manner free from consideration of irrelevant and constitutionally imperEleventh Circuit's counterintuitive hybridization of eighth and fourteenth amendment
doctrine arguably makes it relevant here. See Brief for Petitioner at 59-61 nn.17-18,
McCleskey (No. 84-6811).
63. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-42 (1976) (An employment test that
is racially neutral on its face but has a racially disproportionate impact does not violate the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment without a showing of a racially
discriminatory purpose.).
64. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 892. In essence, the Eleventh Circuit regarded the distinctions
between the eighth and fourteenth amendments as matters of little consequence. The court
decided that claims under any provision of the Constitution, if based on racial discrimination,
give rise to identical proof requirements. Significantly, the court saw no need to cite authority
for its decision to collapse the Bill of Rights into a single constitutional cause of action, which
is not realistically capable of proof. See supra notes 62-63 & infra notes 65-87 and
accompanying text.
65. See McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 890-92.
Historically, the Court's interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause has
focused on the correctness of the punishment, not the intent of the governmental body
inflicting the punishment. The Eleventh Circuit conceded this point in analyzing McCleskey's
claim. "Due process and cruel and unusual punishment cases do not normally focus on the
intent of the governmental actor." Id. The court argued, however, that when the claim is
based on decisions made within the process, "then purpose, intent, and motive are natural
components of the proof that discrimination actually occurred." Id. This is a distinction
without a difference. Conceiving of a due process or eighth amendment claim that does not
focus on, or is not triggered by, decisions made within the challenged governmental process is
a daunting task indeed.
Critics of the intent requirement in equal protection challenges attacked Washington v.
Davis as placing discrimination claims beyond the practical reach of proof. 426 U.S. 229
(1976). See Binion, Intent and Equal Protection:A Reconsideration, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 397,
397-411 (requiring proof of intent in the equal protection context is unjust and impracticable);
Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93
YALE L.J. I 11, 124 (1983) (the intent requirement permits legislatures to disproportionately
burden minorities so long as its stated purpose is nondiscriminatory).
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missible factors. 66 In his brief to the Supreme Court, McCleskey cited
concurring opinions in Furman for the proposition that the Eleventh
Circuit's intent requirement was novel and unprecedented. 67 Studies
have demonstrated that juries may act in a discriminatory fashion
even when they have no conscious intention to do so. 68 Consequently,
requiring proof of intent may be requiring the impossible.6 9
In dissent, Judge Johnson questioned the Eleventh Circuit's inappropriate amalgamation of McCleskey's eighth and fourteenth
amendment claims, and its improper rejection of them under an equal
protection intentionality test:
Discretion hinders inquiry into intent: if unfairness and inconsistency are to be detected even when they are not overwhelmingly
obvious, effects evidence must be relied upon....
...the need for the state to constrain the discretion of juries
in the death penalty area is unusual by comparison to other areas
of the law. It demonstrates the need to rely on systemic controls as
a way to reconcile discretion and consistency; the same combined
objectives argue for the use of effects evidence rather than waiting
for evidence of improper motives in specific cases.70
66. See Brief for Petitioner at 97. McCleskey argues that the court of appeals erred in
demanding proof of "specific intent to discriminate" as a necessary element of the eighth
amendment claim. He also argues that none of the concurring opinions in Furman required
proof of intent, and finally that it is the state's "constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply
its law in a manner that avoids this outcome." Brief for the Petitioner at 97-99 (citing Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420, 428 (1980); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977)).
67. The sentencing process's results are the focus of eighth amendment inquiries. "The

death penalty is cruel and unusual if there is no meaningful basis of distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring). McCleskey argues that his claim should be
analyzed after "put[ting] ... to one side" the question of intent. Brief for the Petitioner at 9798 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring)). He claims that the Court's task
is not "to divine what motives compelled these death penalties." Brief for Petitioner at 98
(citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring)).
68. See, e.g., Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 passim
(1985) (Social scientists using mock jury settings have proven that even where completely
unintended, jury bias based on race has occurred in a totally subconscious manner thereby
making proof of intent impossible.).
69. McCleskey argues that:
The task of identifying precisely where and how, consciously or
unconsciously, race is influencing the literally thousands of actors involved in
criminal sentencing-prosecutors, judges, jurors who assemble to make a single
decision in a single case, only to be replaced by other jurors in the next case, and
still others after them-is virtually impossible.
Brief for Petitioner at 100, McCleskey (No. 84-6811).
70. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 909-10 (11th Cir. 1985) (Johnson, Hatchett &
Clark, JJ., dissenting in part, concurring in part), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
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In support of its position, the Eleventh Circuit cited cases which

either appear irrelevant to the eighth amendment issue, or are based
on circuit precedent of questionable validity.7 ' In Adams v. Wainwright,72 the Eleventh Circuit required proof of intent, but specifically
associated that requirement with a fourteenth amendment challenge.7 Although the Adams court did not mention the eighth
amendment, it specifically cited one plausible reading of a former
Fifth Circuit opinion, Spinkellink v. Wainwright,74 for the proposition
that a facially neutral death sentencing statute forecloses all eighth
amendment challenges.75 In McCleskey, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
this reading of Spinkellink.76 In Smith v. Balkcom, 7 the Fifth Circuit
stated that an eighth amendment challenge requires a showing of
intent,7 but it may have reached that conclusion because it wrongly
believed that Spinkellink compelled such a result.79 In Sullivan v.
Wainwright,8" the court based its rejection of a claim of systemic
racial discrimination on Spinkellink and Adams.8 ' In McCleskey, the
Eleventh Circuit partially overruled Spinkellink while, at least, in
part, basing its intent requirement on cases which had relied on
Spinkellink.82 Defendants in all three of the cases cited presented statistical data purporting to show discriminatory sentencing in the Florida system.8 3 The Supreme Court denied a request for a stay of
execution in Sullivan, 4 and denied petitions for certiorari in Adams"5
71. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 890.
72. 709 F.2d 1443 (1 1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 U.S. 745 (1984).
73. Adams, 709 F.2d at 1449.
74. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
75. Adams, 709 F.2d at 1449-50. See also Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
76. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 891.
77. 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981), reh'g denied, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. Unit B
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
78. Smith, 660 F.2d at 584.
79. See McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 910 n.5 (Johnson, Hatchett & Clark, JJ., dissenting in part,
concurring in part); see also Smith, 660 F.2d at 584 (Petitioner failed to prove "intentional
discrimination against him in this particular case.").
80. 721 F.2d 316 (1lth Cir.), petition for stay denied, 464 U.S. 109 (1983).
81. Id. at 317.
82. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 890-91.
83. The McCleskey court reasoned that the statistical showing of discrimination in the
Florida cases was stronger than those numbers presented by McCleskey and, as the Supreme
Court had rejected further consideration of those cases, it was fair to assume the Court would
likewise reject the evidence that McCleskey submitted. See McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 897.
84. Sullivan v. Wainwright, 721 F.2d 316 (11th Cir. 1983), petition for stay denied, 464
U.S. 109 (1983).
85. Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1143 (1 1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 U.S. 745
(1984).
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and Smith .86 The Eleventh Circuit implied that these denials supported its intent requirement, but the Supreme Court gave no such
endorsement and, in fact, has held that such actions are not to be
taken as comments on the merits of a case.8 7
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's position, the Supreme Court
has consistently taken a systemic perspective when confronted with
death penalty challenges based on the eighth amendment. 88 The
Court's observation, in Gregg v. Georgia,89 that a "patternof arbitrary
and capricious sentencing" violates the eighth amendment demonstrated this approach. 90
The Eleventh Circuit may have reasoned that if it found McCleskey's statistics persuasive, it would be unable to give an adequate remedy without crippling or shutting down the Georgia death sentencing
system. McCleskey, however, insisted that even if the current version
of the Georgia death sentencing statute is not unconstitutional per se,
the unspoken, yet pervasive, racial animus of Georgia's state actors
prevents them from administeringit constitutionally.
Similarly, although the Supreme Court has adhered to a systemic
approach in the past, it might be reluctant to do so in McCleskey.
Because McCleskey questions the ability of sentencers to apply the
death penalty without regard to race, it appears to impugn the very
heart of our legal heritage: the notion of an impartial jury.
III.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

A.

Introduction

In McCleskey v. Kemp, 9' the Eleventh Circuit, perhaps reflexively protecting a belief that any death sentencing system which
affords some discretion must necessarily tolerate some racial discrimination, 92 attempted to neutralize statistical proof of the impact of dis86. Smith v. Balkcom, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
87. As the petitioner pointed out in his brief, first, the Court did not address the
magnitude of disparities in these cases; second, Court orders respecting applications for stays
of execution "may not be taken ... as a statement ... on the merits." Graves v. Barnes, 405

U.S. 1201, 1204 (1972) (Powell, J., in chambers); accord Alabama v. Evans, 461 U.S. 230, 236
n.* (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting), cited in Brief for Petitioner at 95, McCleskey (84-681 1).
88. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 909-10 (Johnson, Hatchett & Clark, JJ., dissenting in part,
concurring in part).

89. 446 U.S. 153 (1976).
90. Id. at 195 n.46 (cited in McCleskey, 753 F.2d. at 909 (Johnson, Hatchett & Clark, JJ.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part) (emphasis added); cf. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 5154 (1984) (examining the California capital sentencing system in its entirety in deciding
whether it provided sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness).
91. 753 F.2d 877 (1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
92. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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crimination. Two aspects of the court's fourteenth amendment
analysis evidence this intent.93 First, the court imposed upon McCleskey's equal protection claim a nearly insurmountable threshold of
proof of purposeful intent, which was higher than Supreme Court precedent mandated94 and was unreasonably stringent in view of the
stakes involved. 95 Second, the court failed to consider an obvious and
persuasive due process argument, which the facts of McCleskey
96
presented and recent Supreme Court precedent supported.
B. Equal Protection
1.

STANDING

A petitioner must first establish standing before he can argue any
constitutional claim. Jurists have called standing one of "the most
amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law." 97 Criminal
defendants' constitutional challenges based on race-of-the-victim discrimination make the standing analysis even more nebulous because
the defendant may be really asserting the victim's rights. 98 Beyond
the preliminary standing requirements of Article III, 99 a petitioner
93. For a discussion of the intent requirement in the eighth amendment context, see supra
notes 62-90 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 166-207 and accompanying text.
97. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1968) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097 Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 465,
467-68 (1966)).
98. See infra notes 111-12.
99. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. A petitioner seeking standing in federal court to allege his
own constitutional injury must first vault the moderate hurdles of Article III. Those hurdles
restrict the power of the judiciary to deciding "cases" and "controversies." See United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). In order to satisfy the "case"
or "controversy" requirement, a petitioner must allege a "present or immediate injury in fact."
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2971 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). Second, he must allege "such apersonal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
the issue." Baker, 369 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added) (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). Third,
he must allege some "causal connection between the asserted injury and the challenged
action." Id. (emphasis added). Finally, the injury alleged "must be of the type likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision." Id. (emphasis added).
A petitioner who seeks to represent the rights of injured third parties, however, must
satisfy certain additional prudential limitations on standing. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975) (absence of judicial self-governance would force courts to decide issues more suitably
decided by other governmental institutions). The Court itself has imposed these limitations as
a further restriction on the scope of its judicial power. See Phillips Petroleum, 105 U.S. at 2971
(recent overview of standing requirements). These limitations may impose high hurdles upon
a petitioner, such as McCleskey, who arguably seeks to vindicate the rights of third parties by
a race-of-the-victim discrimination claim.
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seeking to represent the rights of someone not before the court faces a
particularly burdensome, judicially-imposed "prudential limitation"' ° on standing: "[O]ne may not claim standing ... to vindicate
the constitutional rights of some third party."''
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. The Court
has granted certain petitioners standing to assert the rights of third
parties under the doctrine of jus tertii.02 In general, the Supreme
Court has permittedjus tertii standing when (1) there exists a substantial relationship between the claimant and third parties;"0 3 (2) it is
impossible for third parties to assert their own constitutional rights;"
(3) a dilution of third-party rights might result if a court denied jus
tertii standing;'0 5 (4) the injury to the petitioner is great;' 0 6and (5) the
petitioner will act as an effective advocate of the third-party rights
involved.'O7
100. See supra note 99.
101. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
444 (1972); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958). Georgia argues
that McCleskey impliedly asserts a third-party claim with his equal protection theory. See
infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Sedler, Standing to Assert
ConstitutionalJus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962); Note, Standing to
Assert ConstitutionalJus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
103. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (granting standing to mail
order contraceptive seller to assert privacy rights of potential customers); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (granting standing to beer seller to assert equal protection rights of 18 to 20year-old beer-drinking men); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (granting standing to
physicians to assert patient's right to challenge statute limiting abortions); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (granting standing to contraceptive distributor to assert right of potential
contraceptive user to challenge statute limiting access to contraceptives); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (granting standing to physicians prescribing contraceptives
to assert rights of patients with whom they had a professional relationship).
104. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 401 U.S.
614 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
105. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
106. See Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
107. The Court, in Singleton v. Wulff, articulated two reasons for this final jus tertii
consideration:
First, the courts should not adjudicate such [third-party] rights unnecessarily,
and it may be that in fact the holders of those rights either do not wish to assert
them, or will be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the in-court litigant is
successful or not ....
Second, third parties themselves usually will be the best
proponents of their own rights. The courts depend on effective advocacy, and
therefore should prefer to construe legal rights only when the most effective
advocates of those rights are before them. The holders of the rights may have a
like preference to the extent they will be bound by the courts' decisions under the
doctrine of stare decisis.
428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976).
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Standing to raise a fourteenth amendment equal protection violation based on "inverse" discrimination based on the victim's race can
proceed under either a first-person theory, a third-party theory, or
both. Under a first-person equal protection theory, McCleskey plausibly asserted that the sentencing system imposed upon him, as a member of a certain group, a harsher punishment than it imposes upon
others charged with the commisison of a similar crime.10 8 Under a
third-party equal protection theory, McCleskey could assert, jus tertii,
the equal protection rights of potential black victims, whose deaths
the state's allegedly discriminatory sentencing system does not vindicate as fully as it vindicates the deaths of white victims."19
Third-party standing is the petitioner's most attenuated standing
theory. The satisfaction of some of thejus tertii considerations might
compel the Supreme Court to grant the petitioner standing to assert
the rights of potential black victims. Onejus tertii factor in particular
suggests that the Court should grant standing under a third-party
analysis: the insurmountable standing requirements facing potential
victims." 0 No one will have first-person standing to assert the rights
of the victims, if only actual victims may persuasively allege the necessary injury in fact, and these actual victims are dead."'
108. See infra notes 124-26.
109. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
110. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). To establish standing, an
"[albstract injury is not enough. The plaintiff must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official
conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both 'real and immediate .... Id. at 10102.
111. A close examination of the district court's analysis reveals its fundamental confusion
regarding the petitioner's standing to raise an equal protection claim in the victim
discrimination context. In apparent deference to the district court's determination of
McCleskey's standing, the court of appeals did not address his standing to assert any of his
fourteenth amendment claims. The district court reluctantly concluded that Eleventh Circuit
precedent compelled granting the petitioner standing to assert an equal protection claim. The
district court stated that, had it been writing on a "clean slate," it would have granted the
petitioner standing to assert a due process claim, but would have denied his eighth amendment
and equal protection claims on standing grounds. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 347
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (construing Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978)), rev'd
sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331
(1986).
The district court's reasons for wishing to deny McCleskey standing to raise his race-ofthe-victim discrimination claim are, at best, questionable. The district court argued:
From a study of equal protection jurisprudence, it becomes apparent that the
norms that underlie equal protection involve two values: (i) the right to equal
treatment is inherently good; and (ii) the right to treatment as an equal is
inherently good .... In this case, however, the evidence shows that the petitioner
is being treated as any member of the majority would, or that petitioner's
immutable characteristics have no bearing on his being treated differently from
any member of the majority. Thus, with reference to his argument that he is
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Two jus tertii factors, however, suggest that the Court could
being discriminated against on the basis of the race of his victim, equal protection
interests are not being implicated.
McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. at 347 (emphasis added).
The district court's conclusion is wrong irrespective of the missing phrase which implicitly completes the language emphasized above. If the court meant to say "the evidence shows
that the petitioner is being treated as any member of the majority would be treated if he had
killed a white person," then the statement is true, but it misdefines the proper comparativeclass
for purposes of equal protection. To compare the petitioner's treatment to that of the narrow
class of other killers of whites is tantamount to comparing, in a sex discrimination context, the
treatment afforded to an individual woman with the treatment afforded to women as a class.
Both comparisons create the illusion of equal treatment by comparing the disadvantaged individual with other members of his disadvantaged class. The proper comparison, in an equal
protection context, is between the disadvantaged individual and all individuals. If, however,
the court meant to say "the evidence shows that the petitioner is being treated as any member
of the majority would be treated if he had killed a person," then the statement is false; the
evidence shows that the system treats killers of whites more severely than it does killers in
general. The thrust of the petitioner's first-person equal protection argument is that he, as a
killer of a white victim, is not receiving treatment equal to that which other killers receive
under the law.
Despite the district court's contrary desires, it granted McCleskey standing, relying upon
a footnote in a previous Eleventh Circuit case, Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 612
n.36 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979). In Spinkellink, a convicted murderer
based eighth and fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection challenges on a
statistical study purporting to demonstrate disparate impact in sentencing. The Spinkellink
court gave the standing issue cursory treatment, addressing it only in this footnote:
Spinkellink has standing to raise the equal protection issue, even though he
is not a member of the class allegedly discriminated against, because such discrimination, if proven, impinges on his constitutional right under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.
Id. at 612 n.36.
In support of this conclusion, the Spinkellink court deferred to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 22 (1975). Taylor involved a male defendant who
objected to the exclusion of women from his jury. Regarding standing, the Court held that
although "Taylor was not a member of the [injured] class ... there is no rule that claims such
as Taylor presents may be made only by those defendants who are members of the [injured
class]." Id. at 526. In support of this statement, the Court relied on the petitioner's sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury, and on its own reasoning in the analogous case of Peters
v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
Peters appears to be the foundation case upon which the Eleventh Circuit relied to establish the petitioner's standing to raise an equal protection argument based on the race of his
victim. In Peters, the Supreme Court granted a white defendant standing to challenge the
exclusion of blacks from his jury. The jury exclusion cases, at first glance, appear analogous to
race-of-the-victim cases to the extent that, in each, the court afforded an injured petitioner
standing to represent the rights of injured members of a group to which he did not belong.
The Court in Peters, however, expressly limited the scope of the petitioner's standing to
due process grounds. Id. at 497. In dismissing Peter's equal protection claim, the Court said:
"He [petitioner] also claims his own rights under the equal protection clause have been violated, a claim we need not consider in light of our disposition." Id. at 497 n.5 (emphasis added).
It may be argued that Peters is a procedurally inappropriate case upon which to base equal
protection standing. The district court in McCleskey v. Zant agreed, saying: "[F]or Spinkellink to articulate an equal protection standing predicate based upon Sixth Amendment and
due process cases can be characterized, at best, as curious." 580 F. Supp at 347.
The district court seemed to approve of the state's standing analysis, which supports the
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arguably deny standing to McCleskey under a third-party analysis.

12

argument that jury exclusion cases are analytically inappropriate to a race-of-the-victim claim.
See McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. at 347. In Peters, the exclusion of a class from the jury
violated not only the rights of potential jurors, but also directly violated the petitioner's right
to a representative jury. Peters, 407 U.S. at 499-500 (All people have a right to partake in the
fair application of justice as jurors, and the sixth amendment guarantees the petitioner a jury
representative of a fair cross-section of society.). Consequently, by redressing the violated
rights of the excluded jurors, the Peters court simultaneously redressed the petitioner's violated
right to a representative jury. This nexus between the respective injuries, and the availability
of a single remedy to redress those injuries, supported the petitioner's standing to represent,jus
tertii, the rights of the excluded jurors.
In the victim discrimination context, however, the potential victim's claim, which
McCleskey would like to represent jus tertii, lacks such a direct relationship with the petitioner's first-party claim if one assumes that potential victims complain that not enough killers
of blacks are executed, and the petitioner complains that too many killers of whites are executed. Consequently, one remedy would not concurrently redress both the potential victim's
and the petitioner's injuries. If one assumes that both groups complain of unequal justice,
however, a rational system that does not impermissibly favor white life at the expense of both
killers of whites and black victims' lives would be a common remedy.
112. At least one federal court has denied a petitioner standing on a similar theory. See
Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 939 (1981). In this case,
however, only the district court addressed the standing issue. See McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F.
Supp. at 346-47. Because the state's brief to the Supreme Court only treats the standing
argument in a short footnote, the Supreme Court may not address the issue.
The state's treatment of standing reads:
Respondent submits that a claim of discrimination based on race of the victim is
not cognizable under the circumstances of the instant case. At least one circuit
court has specifically rejected statistical evidence based on race of the victim,
finding that the defendant lacked standing. Even those justices raising a question
of possible racial discrimination in Furman seemed to focus on race of the
defendant and not race of the victim. Thus, respondent submits the instant claim
is not cognizable due to the lack of standing.
Brief for Respondent at 10 n. 1,McCleskey (No. 84-6811) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
An Eighth Circuit case, Britton v. Rogers, which denied a petitioner standing to raise a
claim nearly identical to that of McCleskey, offered this rationale:
[The petitioner] . . . also maintains that when the victim of a rape is white,
the sentence imposed . . . will be significantly harsher than when the victim is
black. [The petitioner] has no standing to raise this claim as a basis for invalidating his sentence. It is the black women ... if anyone, who should be raising this
claim, not [the petitioner], a convicted rapist. Moreover, it is not even clear
whether ... black women could show sufficient injury in fact to have standing to
sue in federal court. As Professor Tribe wrote:
A citizen's interest in the fair enforcement of the law by government agencies or administrators presents a particularly troubling claim as a basis for standing. Even if one assumes, as seems reasonable, that proper enforcement of the
law maintains public security and provides an environment for individual productivity and tranquility, the connection between this general premise and any
particular person's material interest is highly attenuated ....
These perspectives
manifest themselves in stringent limits on standing to challenge allegedly discriminatory administration of the criminal laws.
Thus, while discriminatory enforcement of criminal laws may be challenged
by those against whom such laws are enforced, persons injured by criminal conduct which goes unpunished because of discriminatory law enforcement do not
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First, the relationship between the murderer and the potential victim
may be substantially less close than any other first-party/third-party
relationship that the Supreme Court has relied on thus far to support
a granting ofjus tertii standing.III Second, the petitioner may not be
an effective advocate" 4 of the rights of potential victims. It may be
argued that the petitioner's desired remedy is the opposite of the remedy desired by potential victims, if one assumes that the underprotected victims want the courts to sentence more killers of blacks to
death. Conversely, the petitioner wants the courts to sentence fewer
killers of whites to death." 5 Nevertheless, Georgia has lost on the
standing issue twice already in McCleskey's case;" 6 it is unlikely,
therefore, that the state will fare any better before the Supreme Court.
2.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 17 The Supreme Court of the
United States has acknowledged that the purpose of the clause is "to
prevent hostile and discriminating State action against any person or
class of persons.""' Further, equal protection under the laws implies
that people "shall not be subjected, for the same offense, to any
greater or different punishment.""' 9
ordinarily have standing to challenge the discrimination: a victim of an undeterred crime is not automatically deemed a victim of nonenforcement.
631 F.2d 572, 577 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added) (quoting R. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-19, at 87-88 (1978)).
Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's intended conclusion, Professor Tribe's analysis proposes
a convincing argument for permitting the petitioner to assert the rights of the potential victim.
Assuming that a court would deny the victim standing, then jus tertii considerations suggest
that the wrong will go unredressed unless the petitioner can assert the victim's rights. But cf.
infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (discussion of how the petitioner might make a poor
advocate of victims' rights and the arguable incompatibility of their respective remedies).
Finally, because the district court determined the petitioner's third-party claim on the
merits, a reviewing court should not deny the petitioner standing to assert that claim. The
Supreme Court, in Craig v. Boren, refused to deny a petitioner standing to represent thirdparty interests because such a preclusion would not further the objectives of prudential limitations where the lower court had already entertained the relevant constitutional challenge, and
the parties had sought, or had not resisted, a constitutional determination on the issue. 429
U.S. 190, 193-94 (1976).
113. See supra note 103.
114. See supra note 107.
115. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
116. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 346-47 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub noma.
McCleskey v. Kemp,753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 3331 (1986).
117. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § I.
118. Pace v.Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1882).
119. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:295

The Supreme Court has held that as long as all members of a
class receive like treatment, the equal protection clause is not violated. 21 It is also true, however, that such a classification cannot be
drawn arbitrarily,' 2' but must "rest upon some difference which bears
a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without
any such basis."'' 22 Thus, the arbitrary delineation of classes is itself
violative of the clause. Further, "[w]hen the law lays an unequal
hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality
offense and [punishes] one and not the other, it has made as invidious
a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality
' 23
for oppressive treatment."'
3.

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

A petitioner in McCleskey's position who asserts an equal protection violation may assert one of two general theories. The first theory supports a first-party equal protection argument. 24 First, the
petitioner is a member of the class of killers of whites. Second, members of that class are more likely to receive the death sentence than are
killers of blacks. ' 25 Third, such a classification, having no reasonable
26
and just relation to the sentencing determination, is arbitrary.
Finally, an increased likelihood of a stricter sentence based on an arbitrary classification violates the equal protection rights of those killers
of whites to whom the law is applied.
The petitioner's second possible equal protection approach is a
120. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190 (1964).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1941) (citing Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
124. For a discussion of the first-party standing perspective, see supra note 99.
125. A weakness inheres in the petitioner's first-party equal protection argument at the
second step. The petitioner's generalized systemic evidence shows only an increased likelihood
of the imposition of the death sentence based on the arbitrary classification. The petitioner can
allege only that a certain percentage of defendants receive more severe sentences based solely
on an arbitrary classification; he cannot allege that he, in particular, received the more severe
sentence. This also undercuts the petitioner's ability to assert injury in fact, one of the
requisites of Article III standing. See supra note 99.
126. Arbitrary state action is constitutionally infirm under both the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. See supra text accompanying note 123. Interestingly, one concurring judge in
McCleskey doubted that the petitioner had presented arbitrariness under the eighth
amendment because McCleskey devoted his entire case to proving that the state was applying
the death penalty in an altogether explicable-albeit impermissible-fashion. McCleskey, 752
F.2d at 905 (Vance, J., concurring). The fact that the application of the death penalty is
explicable on racial grounds, however, does not mean that it is rational, or lacks arbitrariness
or capriciousness.
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third-party, 127 race-of-the-victim argument which parallels his firstparty argument. First, there exists a class of "potential black capital
crime victims." Second, because fewer killers of blacks are sentenced
to death, the lives of the members of that class are less effectively
protected and vindicated under the law than are the lives of "potential
white capital crime victims.' 28 Third, such a classification, bearing
no reasonable and just relation to the extent of legal protection a citizen deserves, is arbitrary. Finally, less-effective protection and vindication under the law based on an arbitrary classification violates the
equal protection rights of those whose rights are less-effectively protected and vindicated.
4.

THE COURT'S TREATMENT OF MCCLESKEY'S CLAIM

a. Precedent
The petitioner relied on the Baldus study in support of the claim

that his death sentence was unconstitutional because Georgia discriminatorily applied the death penalty on the basis of the race of both the
defendant

129

and the victim. 3 ' McCleskey claimed this data proved

that the Georgia system13 1violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.

Consistent with equal protection precedent, the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's determination that proof of purposeful
discriminatory intent was an element of the petitioner's equal protec127. For a discussion of the third-party standing perspective, see supra notes 110-16 and
accompanying text.
128. This logical step assumes that the death penalty, when imposed, effectively vindicates
the deaths of actual victims by executing actual murderers and protects the lives of potential
victims by deterring potential murderers. Vindication and deterrence theories are not
universally accepted, however; at least one commentator has argued that capital punishment is
unjustified because it fails to fully satisfy its retributive/vindictive purpose. She argues that
true retribution or vindication requires a defendant to experience, and even accept, his just
deserts. But because no one can fully appreciate the ultimate finality of death, capital
sentencing fails to be fully retributive. Gale, Retribution, Punishment, and Death, 18 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 973 (1985).
129. The Eleventh Circuit only superficially discussed the race-of-the-defendant
discrimination approach in its opinion. It is surprising that the court treated the argument at
all in light of the reason McCleskey proferred the Baldus study. Moreover, Dr. Baldus himself
has denied any conclusiveness as to race-of-the-defendant discrimination based on the data he
gathered: "We found that in rural areas black defendants with white victims still received
somewhat more severe treatment, but the differences were not statistically significant." Baldus,
Monitering and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems.- Lessons from Georgia, 18
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1404 (1985) (emphasis added).
130. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 885.
131. The district court suggested that the petitioner had alleged facts more appropriately
supporting a due process violation. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 348 (N.D. Ga.
1984), rev'd sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 3331 (1986).
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tion claim.' 32 The court relied upon Village of Arlington Heights v.

MetropolitanHousingDevelopment Corp. '33 in support of this proposition. Perhaps consciously attempting to screen statistical challenges,
such as that of the petitioner, from judicial review, the Eleventh Circuit set up an exceedingly difficult requisite threshold for proof of discriminatory intent in the capital punishment context. The McCleskey
threshold surpasses even that which the Supreme Court imposed in
Arlington Heights,'34 and is unreasonably demanding because in this
context, the problems of proof are more pronounced' 35 and the injury
suffered is unquestionably more severe.' 36
In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court held that a municipality's refusal to rezone certain land to permit the construction of
racially integrated, low and moderate income housing did not violate
the equal protection clause, even though the refusal was likely to have
a disproportionately adverse impact on blacks. The Court found that
37
racial discrimination had not motivated the rezoning refusal.
Rather, the Court suggested that the actual motive was the municipal
residents' legitimate desire to protect the value of their real property. 38 Citing Washington v. Davis,1 39 the Court held that "official
action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a
racially disproportionate impact,"'" and that "[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause."''
In proving intent or purpose,
132.
133.
134.
135.

McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 892.
429 U.S. 252 (1977).
See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.

136. Id.
137. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 270.
138. Id.
139. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
140. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-65. One commentator has observed that
before a law is presumptively unconstitutional under [a disproportionate impact
theory] ... three factors must be present. First, the plaintiff must be a member of
a group that has suffered from a history of discrimination and that is still
suffering from that discrimination. Second, there must be government action
that disproportionately affects the group. And third, there must be some causal
connection between the history of discrimination and the disproportionate
character of the impact. In most cases, however, there will be little controversy

over the presence of these factors. The crucial issue is more likely to be whether
the disproportion is greater than necessary to achieve the governmental objective.
Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540,
559 n.100 (1977).
141. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265. In contrast with Washington, every circuit court of
appeals that had previously faced the question of intent in a fourteenth amendment context

had declined to impose an intent requirement, focusing instead on the effects of various public
policies. Binion, supra note 65, at 410 n.55 (citing MHDC v. Arlington Heights, 517 F.2d 409
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"[s]ometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than
race, emerges from the effect of state action even when the governing
legislation appears neutral on its face."' 42 Absent a stark pattern,
however, the 43Court would not consider impact alone to be
determinative. 1
Significantly, if there is no stark pattern of adverse impact, "the
Court must look to other evidence."' 44 In Arlington Heights, the
Court enumerated four sources of circumstantial and direct evidence
from which a court may draw supplementary proof of discriminatory
intent: (1) "[t]he impact of the official action-whether it 'bears more
heavily on one race than another,' "145 (2) "[t]he historical background of the decision ... particularly if it reveals a series of official

actions taken for invidious purposes,"

146

(3) "[t]he specific sequence

(7th Cir. 1975); Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Otero v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d
Cir. 1972); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971); Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.
1971); Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1010 (1970); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th
Cir. 1970)).
One legal analyst has suggested two rationales to explain why the judiciary favors an
intent rule over an impact approach in the equal protection context. (1) Courts arepreoccupied
with process-based theories. "In the realm of equal protection, the Court appears to be
concerned with only the cleanliness of the process by which to make policy choices, but not
independently with the consequences of these choices. When laws are challenged as racist or
sexist, a preoccupation with process values explains the tendency to ask whether this result
motivated the decisionmakers, that is, whether the process of decisionmaking was perverted by
a discriminatory intent." Binion, supra note 65, at 403-08. (2) Courts are apprehensive about
potential,far-reachingjudicial remedies. There is concern about both the extensiveness of the
remedies and the frequency with which they would be sought. Id.
Professor Binion objects to the intent rule in the equal protection context because first, the
clause itself includes no reference to intent. Second, precedent suggests an impact approach
rather than an intent approach. Prior to Washington, every circuit court case facing the issue
took an impact approach, and the Supreme Court cases addressing the issue in the voting,
welfare, education, and public facilities contexts suggest an effects approach is more
appropriate than an intent approach. And third, there is no reason to impose the intent
requirement on the equal protection clause when it had not existed in any other constitutional
provision. Id. at 409-20.
142. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 242). In
Washington, the petitioner brought a claim under the implied federal equal protection
component of the fifth amendment. Washington, 426 U.S. at 288. Because equal protection
challenges under the fifth and the fourteenth amendments require the same analysis, Arlington
Heights appropriately incorporated the Washington holding. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at
264-66.
143. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Id. (citing Washington, 426 U.S. at 242).
146. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.
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of events leading up to the challenged decision,"'' 47 and (4) "[t]he legislative or administrative history ... especially where there are contemporary statements of the decisionmaking body."' 4 8
b.

Ignored Sources of Evidence

In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court expressly delineated the
proper sources from which a court must draw evidence to supplement
insufficient proof of disproportionate impact.' 49 To follow accurately
the Arlington Heights guidelines, rather than dismissing the Baldus
study as unconvincing and the petitioner's equal protection claim
with it, the McCleskey court of appeals first should have looked to the
historical background of discrimination in the South.1 0 It did not do
this. The court ignored the obvious fact that the equal protection
clause amended the Constitution specifically to protect the freed
slaves from racial persecution by the Southern White majority.' 5 '
Additionally, the court ignored the Black Codes, which facially provided for harsher punishments for blacks than whites charged with
similar crimes after emancipation. 5 2 More recently, the persistent
volume of civil rights claims illustrates the lingering tradition of
Southern racial discrimination. 5 ' Instead, the McCleskey court
looked no further than the petitioner's statistics, ignoring at least one
147. Id.

148. Id. at 268.
149. Id. at 266-68.
150. The district court in McCleskey v. Zant defensively acknowledged the historic reality
of racial discrimination in the South. 580 F. Supp. 338, 368 n.5 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub
noma.McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
Conveniently, the district court found the Baldus study convincing insofar as it tended to "put
to rest ... stereotypical prejudice againstSouthern jurisdictions ...." Id. (emphasis added).
151. See, e.g., Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 454 U.S. 1110 (1981) (White, J., dissenting);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
152. See Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 132 (1981). "Individual Southern States had
begun enacting the so-called Black Codes, which, although not technically resurrecting the
institution of slavery, were viewed by the Republican Congress as a large step in that
direction." Id. at 132 (citing E. MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA DURING

THE PERIOD OF THE RECONSTRUCTION

29-44 (1871)

(compilation and discussion of the Black Codes)).
One scholar has suggested that in American society, with its history of racial oppression,
those states whose laws disproportionately disadvantage blacks should bear a threefold burden.
First, the state must prove that the challenged law bears a substantial relation to its purported
objective. Second, the state must prove that alternative means to the same objective would not
work nearly as well. Third, the state must demonstrate that the objective outweighs the
disadvantage disproportionately affecting blacks. Perry, supra note 140, at 561 n.104 (1977).
This approach considers many of the same factors the Supreme Court used when evaluating
the due process propriety of administrative action. See infra note 178 and accompanying text.
153. See Diamond & Cottrol, Codifying Caste, 29 Loy. L. REV. 255, 265 (1983);
Finkelman, Exploring Southern Legal History, 64 N.C.L. REV. 77, 88-101 (1985).
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of the supplemental and potentially persuasive evidentiary sources
that the Supreme Court afforded him in Arlington Heights.'54 Only if
the court looked at this evidence could the petitioner have hoped to
meet the difficult burden of proof of intentional discrimination.
Reduced Proof of Intent When the Stakes Are High and
Discrimination May Go Undetected
Even if the Eleventh Circuit rightfully ignored historical evidence of discrimination in Georgia, it should not have placed the element of intent beyond the practical limits of proof. In McCleskey, the
court of appeals expressed a particularly rigid view of the Arlington
Heights intent requirement, making it extremely difficult for the petitioner to satisfy that requirement.' 5 This occurred despite the
Supreme Court's statement in Arlington Heights that in certain analogous contexts, the Arlington Heights intent requirement should be
relaxed.156 For example, the Supreme Court has stated that, because
of the nature of the jury selection task, a constitutional violation may
does not compel the inferbe found even when the statistical 1pattern
57
ence of intentional discrimination.
The Supreme Court probably was wary of the difficulty in
detecting the existence of discrimination, given the discretion inherent
in the jury selection process.' 58 It was likely concerned over the
profound impact that undetected discrimination could have on the
freedom and rights of the defendant.' 59 These two concerns ultimately may have compelled the Court to relax the burden of proof of
intent in the jury cases. Because both concerns are present and are
magnified in the capital sentencing cases,'16 the Court should relax
the burden of proof of intent in this context as well.
In another setting, the Supreme Court held that proof of express
discriminatory purpose is not required to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination in the grand jury selection process. Instead, in Castaneda v. Partida,16 the Court laid out three showings that a petitioner must make to establish an equal protection violation. The
petitioner must show that (1) the group allegedly being excluded is a
c.

154. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.

155. "[T]he majority's evaluation of the evidence in this case is, if anything, more strict
than in other contexts." McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 913 n.14 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
156. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 n. 13

(1977).
157. Id.
158. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 911-13 (Johnson, J.,dissenting).
159. Id.

160. Id.
161. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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recognizable class; (2) that group has been substantially underrepresented over time; and (3) the selection procedure is discretionary
and susceptible to abuse. The petitioner's successful showing shifts
the burden of proof to the state to rebut the presumption of discrimi62
nation by offering neutral grounds for its selectivity.
In a related context, a very recent Supreme Court case suggested
three showings that would establish a prima facie case of racially
biased peremptory challenges to jurors.' 63 The petitioner must show

that (1) he is a member of of a recognizable racial group; (2) the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire
members of the petitioner's racial group; and (3) other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to exclude the veniremen from the jury on account of their
race. In Batson v. Kentucky, 164 the Court held that such a showing, as
in Castaneda, shifts the burden to the State to come forward with a
65
neutral explanation for challenging the jurors.
C. Due Process
1.

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides
that "[n]o state shall ...

deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-

erty without due process of law."' 166 Unlike an equal protection analysis, due process arguments do not lend themselves to discrete, stepby-step analysis. This is primarily because "[flor all its consequences,
'due process' has never been, and perhaps never can be, precisely
defined."'

1 67

In determining whether a death sentencing system is "fundamentally fair"' 168 to a petitioner, "due process of the law within the mean162. Id. at 494-95. See generally Note, To Infer or Not to Infer a DiscriminatoryPurpose:
Rethinking Equal Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. _ (1986) (arguing that the
Castaneda requirements should be applied to the victim discrimination context).
163. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1722-23 (1986).
164. Id. at 1723.
165. The Batson requirements, however, seem to require proof that the prosecutor removed
black members specifically from the petitioner's jury, while the Castanedarequirements appear
only to require a history of discrimination against the group in general. This suggests a shift in
the Supreme Court's attitude toward requiring a particularized showing of discrimination,
analogous to that which the court of appeals required in McCleskey.
166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
167. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981).
168. "[Flundamental fairness [is] a requirement whose meaning can be as oblique as its
importance is lofty. Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise
which must discover what 'fundamental fairness' consists of in a particular situation by first
considering any relevant precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at
stake." Id.
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ing of the fourteenth amendment mandates that the laws operate on
all alike such that an individual is not subject to an arbitraryexercise
of governmentalpower."' 69 Further, "[d]ue process requires a competent and impartial tribunal."1 70 "[T]he Due Process Clause protects a
defendant from jurors who are actually incapable of rendering an
impartial verdict, based on the evidence and the law."1 7 1 Under a due
process analysis, a defendant is entitled to protection not only from
actual jury bias, but also from the mere likelihood or appearance of
72
bias. 1
2.

DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS

Adhering to constitutional principles, McCleskey plausibly may
assert the following procedural 73 due process argument challenging
the "fundamental fairness" 7 4 of the Georgia death sentencing system:
The petitioner, as a member of the class of killers of whites, is more
likely to receive the death penalty than are the killers of blacks.
Because the death sentencing system "does not operate on all alike,"

he is subject to "an arbitrary exercise of governmental power."' 75
permitting the consideration of an impermissible factor, namely
race of McCleskey's victim, in determining his death sentence,
court went beyond its jurisdiction and based his sentence, not "on

In
the
the
the

169. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 348 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (emphasis added) (citing
Leeper v. Texas, 139 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1891); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36
(1884)), rev'd sub nor. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106
S. Ct. 3331 (1986).
170. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
171. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1971).
172. The Supreme Court "has held that due process is denied by circumstances that create
the likelihood or appearanceof bias." Id. at 502 (emphasis added).
173. The petitioner's allegations may implicate concerns of substantive due process as well.
He might claim a denial of his fundamental right to life without due process of law. The
Supreme Court, however, has held that "it is not necessary to resolve [a] substantive [due
process] claim, if a narrower inquiry discloses that essential procedures have not been
followed." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976). Accordingly, in addressing
the propriety of discrimination in the capital sentencing system where interracial crimes are
involved, the Supreme Court has considered the due process issue at only the procedural level.
See, e.g., Turner v. Murray, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 1689 (1986). Thus, it may be more appropriate to
to treat the due process issue in McCleskey at the procedural level rather than at the
substantive level. Further, the availability of the specific constitutional command that defines a
criminal defendant's right to be free from arbitrary death-sentencing makes a substantive due
process theory unnecessary to the Court's consideration of McCleskey's claim. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
174. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
175. The Constitution condemns arbitrary state action not only through the eighth
amendment but through fourteenth amendment due process as well. See supra text
accompanying note 169.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:295

evidence or the law,"' 76 but rather on the race of his victim. This
argument, while not entirely unrelated to the equal protection argument, is free from the more rigorous strictures of equal protection
analysis because it proceeds under the flexible "fundamental fairness
concept."' 77
The Supreme Court weighs three factors in determining whether
state action violates the fundamental fairness standard of procedural
due process:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneousdeprivation ofsuch interest through

the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the78 additional or substitute procedural
requirements will entail. 1

The Supreme Court originally articulated these factors in order
to determine the propriety under the due process clause of administrative actions. 79 Courts, however, have employed these factors in the
176. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
177. Interestingly, on certiorari to the Supreme Court, McCleskey has not yet raised a due
process argument. The questions presented in the petitioner's brief raise only equal protection
and eighth amendment issues:
(1) To make out a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, must a condemned inmate alleging racial
discrimination in a State's application of its capital sentencing statutes present
statistical evidence "so strong as to permit no inference other than that the
results are a product of racially discriminatory intent or purpose?"
(2) Is proof of intent to discriminate a necessary element of an Eighth
Amendment claim that a State has applied its capital statutes in an arbitrary,
capricious and unequal manner?
(3) Must a condemned inmate present specific evidence that he was personally
discriminated against in order to obtain either Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment
relief on the grounds that he was sentenced to die under a statute administered in
an arbitrary or racially discriminatory manner?
(4) Does a proven racial disparity in the imposition of capital sentences,
reflecting a systematic bias against black defendants and those whose victims are
white, offend the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments irrespective of its
magnitude?
(5) Does an average 20-point racial disparity in death-sentencing rates among
that class of cases in which a death sentence is a serious possibility so undermine
the evenhandedness of a capital sentencing system as to violate the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment rights of a death sentenced black inmate?
Brief for Petitioner at i-ii, McCleskey (No. 84-6811).
McCleskey's failure to make a due process argument, however, does not bar the Court
from raising the issue sua sponte. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 264-65 (1981)
(concluding that the Court was empowered to consider the due process issue even though
petitioners raised only an equal protection claim).
178. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (emphasis added).
179. Id.
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criminal context to determine the procedural propriety of state
action. 8 0 Because it involves consequences that are infinitely more
severe than the consequences of either administrative or typical criminal proceedings,'' capital sentencing deserves closer due process
scrutiny. The Court's factors, therefore, suggest a minimal level of
due process scrutiny with which to consider the propriety of the
Georgia capital sentencing system.
The private interest at stake in the McCleskey context-the petitioner's life-certainly has no equal. To deprive McCleskey of this
one interest is to deprive him of all.
The second factor, the value of alternate procedures, strikes a
balance between the risk of error and the availability and effectiveness
of potential reform. Here, the risk is an increased likelihood that a
sentencer will prescribe death on the basis of the constitutionally
impermissible criteria of the victim's race." 2 If this risk exists, it
exists in a system that demands discretion. Discretionary systems, by
definition, allow the decision maker to privately consider impermissible criteria. 183 If the Supreme Court is intent on upholding the death
penalty, there is no ideal remedy.' 84
The third factor, the government interest at stake, considers the
purpose of the challenged action and the administrative repercussions
of reform. The state typically contends that the death penalty deters
capital crimes, punishes capital offenders, vindicates the lives of victims, and incapacitates capital offenders who otherwise might inflict
further harm on society." 5 Whether capital punishment actually
180.
181.
182.
183.

See, e.g., Britton v. Rogers, 631 F.2d 572, 581 (8th Cir. 1980).
See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
A system of mandatory death sentencing would eliminate discretion at the sentencing

level. Such a solution, however, generates consequences as severe as the problem it purports to
solve. For example, mandatory systems leave no room for the administration of mercy in cases
where mercy is appropriate. As a result, the Court has invalidated mandatory capital
sentencing schemes. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
184. Repeated attempts at "reform" could ease the collective conscience of a "moral"
society, but even the most thorough reform of a discretionary system can only reduce, not
eliminate, discrimination. Further, apparent but meaningless reform could conceivably
continue ad infinitum. Even the most moderate reform would render obsolete old data

evidencing discrimination in the system. Consequently, years would have to pass while
statisticians amassed new data analyzing sentencing patterns under the "reformed" system. If
a discriminatory pattern emerged from the new data, a new "reform" could be implemented.
But, like halving the distance between oneself and a wall, this procedure could continue
indefinitely. See Hubbard, supra note 27, at 1136.
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has suggested that procedural due process
compels the implementation of reasonable safeguards geared towards the minimization of

discrimination in the interracial crime context. Turner v. Murray, 106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
185. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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achieves any of these ends is the subject of considerable dispute.1 16
The cost of any procedural safeguards to the state is minimal compared to the value of the individual interest at stake in the instant
87
case. 1
As is often the case when examining a balancing test, one is left
without definite answers. In a very recent decision, Turner v. Murray,88 however, the Supreme Court struck a procedural due process
balance in a context analogous to this case. Turner may be a harbinger of the Court's approach to the McCleskey case. The Court's conclusions in Turner suggest that procedural due process requires
systemic reform, but not the constitutional invalidation, of the deathsentencing system.
3.

THE AVAILABILITY OF A REMEDY:

Turner v. Murray

In Turner v. Murray,18 9 a black petitioner in Virginia had
received the death sentence for killing a white jeweler. 190 Prior to the
voir dire, the defendant submitted to the trial judge a list of questions
designed to eliminate racially biased jurors.' 91 The trial judge refused
to present these questions to the jury. 192 The defendant petitioned for
habeas corpus relief, arguing that the trial judge's refusal deprived
him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.' 93 The district court
denied his petition and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.194 The Supreme Court, after granting certiorari, held that a
defendant accused of an interracial capital crime has a right to inform
prospective jurors of the victim's race and to question them on the
issue of racial bias. 195
186. See generally Gale, supra note 128 (Capital punishment is not fully retributive.).
187. See generally Comment, The Cost of Taking Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death
Penalty, 18 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1221 (1985) (Capital punishment and procedural safeguards

are more costly than life imprisonment.).
188.
189.
190.
191.

106 S. Ct. 1683 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 1685.
The proposed questions included the following: "The defendant.., is a member of the

Negro Race. The victim ... was a white Caucasian. Will these facts prejudice you against [the
defendant] or affect your ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the
evidence?" Id. at 1685. Note that this instruction could stem only conscious discrimination,
while unconscious discrimination is just as harmful and possibly more pervasive. Id. at 1687;
see Johnson, supra note 68, at 1679.
192. Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1685.

193. Id. at 1686.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1688. In the state trial court, the petitioner proffered a statistical study showing
that black defendants who kill white victims are sentenced to death with disproportionate
frequency. The district court stated that the study, which was based on statistics compiled in
other states, had little utility in establishing the potential for racial prejudice in Virginia.
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Significantly, several of the Court's concerns in Turner are
directly relevant to a race of the victim discrimination claim:
Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital
sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunityfor racialprejudice
to operate but remain undetected. On the facts of this case, a juror

who believes that blacks are violence-prone or morally inferior
might well be influenced by that belief in deciding whether petitioner's crime involved the aggravating factors specified under Virginia law. . . . More subtle, less consciously held racial attitudes
could also influence a juror's decision in this case. Fear of blacks,

which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner's
crime, might incline a juror to favor the death penalty.
The risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing proserious in light of the complete finality of the
ceeding is especially
96
death sentence.1

This language signifies that the Court has recognized the existence of, and the undetectable danger inherent in, unconscious discrimination. Because this form of discrimination evades detection, and
because the stakes are so high, the Court expressed sincere concern
over situations, such as interracial crimes, that create a mere risk of
jury bias. The Turner Court placed interracial crimes among a class
of offenses in which the possibility of racial discrimination in conviction and sentencing always merits attention: " 'It remains an unfortunate fact in our society that violent crimes perpetrated against
members of other racial or ethnic groups often raise [a reasonable possibility that racial prejudice would influence the jury].' -197
Most significantly, the Court explicitly recognized the necessity
of weighing the risk of discrimination against the availability and utility of a remedy in a due process-styled balance. "[W]e find the risk of
racial prejudice may have infected the petitioner's capital sentencing
unacceptable in light of the ease with which that risk could have been
minimized."' 98 This statement implies that the Constitution tolerates

a minimal risk of discrimination, provided that the judicial system
takes all reasonable precautions to reduce the risk. Procedures
designed to reduce the risk of racial bias can reduce-to a degreethe risk of prejudicial sentencing by screening prejudice at a number
Turner v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 513, 523 n.9, 273 S.E.2d 36, 42 n.9 (1980). The Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to evaluate the statistical studies in light of its disposition of the
other issues. Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1689 n. 11. The Supreme Court in McCleskey could dispose
of the Baldus study in much the same manner.
196. Turner, 106 S. Ct. at 1687-88 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
197. Id. at 1687 n.7 (brackets in original) (quoting Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S.
182, 192 (1981)).
198. Id. at 1688 (emphasis added).
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of critical stages of the conviction/sentencing system. Specifically,
existing procedural safeguards in this context work toward (1) screening out biased jurors, and (2) assuring representative juries.
The Turner Court's requirement of voir dire on racial prejudice
for trials of interracial crimes' 9 9 illustrates the Court's method of
screening out biasedjurors. This approach, however, suffers from two
mistaken assumptions. First, it assumes that superficial questioning
could make an unconsciously-biased juror recognize his prejudice and
disclose it. 200 Second, it assumes that consciously-biased jurors would
answer truthfully when questioned as to their prejudicial tendencies.
Only a much more probing-and a much lengthier and expensivevoir dire could approach an effective remedy in the McCleskey
context.2 o'
Under Batson v. Kentucky,2 °2 a prima facie case of racially selective peremptory challenges was fairly easily made out.2" 3 Batson is
indicative of the Supreme Court's method of assuring the defendant a
representative jury. The requisite showings, however, include proof
that the state has used peremptory challenges to exclude members of
the petitioner's race from the petitioner's jury.2 °4 While it may be a
simple matter for a petitioner alleging racially biased peremptory
challenges to show specific examples of such conduct, it is nearly
impossible for a petitioner alleging racially influenced sentencing, like
McCleskey, to make such a particularized showing. 20 5 To apply ihe
Batson elements to McCleskey's case would not ease his burden of
proof at all. His inability to prove individualized, intentional discrimination in his particular case, which arguably defeats his equal protection claim under Arlington Heights,2 °6 would similarly defeat his due
process claim under Batson.2° 7 The risk of bias might nonetheless
199. Id. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
200. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 1675.
201. Id. at 1676.
202. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
203. Id. at 1722-24. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (discussion of the
Batson elements of a prima facie case).
204. See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (discussion of the petitioner's generalized
showing of systemic, not particularized,discrimination).
206. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
207. Contra Note, supra note 162 (arguing that the Batson elements would aid a petitioner
like McCleskey).
There remains an innovative but unprecedented alternative remedy to the problem of
racially prejudiced death sentencing. The Court could create for defendants like McCleskey,
accused of interracial capital crimes, a right to a jury that includes jurors of the defendant's
race. Ideally, if six, or even three jurors were of the same race as the defendant, one of the
group could "hang" a jury otherwise prone to imposing a racially motivated death sentence.
This approach allows the race at risk to fight fire with fire. Proponents of this remedy argue
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prompt the Court to examine the record below to see if a Turnerstyled voir dire took place, and to remand if such was prevented by
the trial judge.
IV.

STATISTICS AND THE LAW

The use of statistics dates back to Biblical times when the sovereign employed people to determine the number of persons who could
be counted as royal subjects.2 ° 8 Since Louis Brandeis's use of empirical evidence before the Supreme Court,2" 9 litigants have successfully
persuaded the courts to take judicial notice of social facts." 0 The
Brandeis brief has received wide acceptance. The brief argues only
that a set of social science data which is relevant to the issue in dispute exists, and not that a particular interpretation of the data is
valid.2 1' The courts, therefore, still have to resolve the problem of the
validity of any scientific material that a litigant brings to their
attention.2 12
The use and significance of statistical techniques in litigation,
particularly multiple regression, 213 have increased significantly since
the end of World War 11.214 Litigants most frequently use multiple
that such a remedy would (1) appease society's dissatisfaction with racially selective
peremptory challenges, (2) lead to more fair decisions, on the assumption that jurors are more
able to correctly judge the character of a racially similar petitioner, and (3) increase society's
faith in the fairness of the judiciary. See Johnson, supra note 68, at 1706-07. Such a remedy,
however, appears equally likely to reinforce the racially similar juror's perception of his role as
the equalizing element in an unfair and racist system, compelling him to vote, not his
conscience, but a bias in favor of the petitioner, to counterbalance the biased votes of the
racially different jurors.
208. Dawson, Scientific Investigation of Fact-The Role of the Statistician, 11 FORUM 896
(1976).
209. Justice Brandeis, in his brief for Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), "assembled a
substantial body of medical and social science research tending to show the debilitating effect
on women of working long hours ..
" Monahan and Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 480 (1986).
210. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 888 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 3331 (1986).
211. Id. "Muller v. Oregon, [208 U.S. 412 (1908)] was the first in what became a series of
'Brandeis briefs' that used empirical data to persuade a court to uphold specific legislation....
The Mueller brief dealt specifically with state regulation of maximum working hours for
women." Note, Statistics in the Law. Potential Problems in the Presentation of Statistical
Evidence, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 313 n.1 (1983) (citations omitted).
212. Sperlich, Social Science Evidence and the Courts.- Reaching Beyond the Adversary
Process, 63 JUDICATURE 280, 285 n.31 (1980).
213. See Rubinfeld, Econometrics in the Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 n.2 (1985)
(the use of multiple regression has increased faster than that of other statistical techniques).
214. R.

WEHMHOEFER,

STATISTICS

IN

LITIGATION:

PRACTICAL

APPLICATION

FOR

§ 1.01 (1985). The increase in the use of statistical techniques is attributable to the
growth in academic programs offering specializations in statistics; the recognition
of quantitative analysis as an important tool for business and governmental
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regression
in cases involving sex and race discrimination under Title
VII.2 15 Other applications of multiple regression have included such
varying contexts as jury selection, housing, and school desegregation
cases.

2 16

Those who support the use of statistical data in the courtroom
praise the capacity of statistics to present a plethora of facts clearly
and provide consistency to a fact finder's analysis.21 7 Statistics present complex empirical issues in an understandable and workable format.2 18 "Opponents of the legal use of mathematical data object to a
potential bias that may not be discoverable upon cross-examination, a
feared over-emphasis on the data's probative value, and the ease with
which an attorney or statistician may manipulate the data. ' 2 19 Critics
fear that a jury could decide to convict or acquit solely on the basis of
22
a statistical probability, rather than on the totality of the evidence. 1
Nevertheless, statistical evidence plays an important role in judicial decisionmaking. The usefulness of such evidence, however,
depends upon what one attempts to prove.2 2 ' Statistical evidence is
more effective when a litigant seeks to prove the existence rather than
the cause of a disparity. Such evidence is even less effective when
intent or motivation is at issue.22 2 A review of the contexts in which
courts have allowed litigants to prove institutional bias or discriminaplanning and forecasting; federal legislation requiring the reporting of statistics
in numerous areas of the law such as discrimination, environmental issues, public
utilities, criminal law, and antitrust; and the recent invention of powerful and
relatively inexpensive personal computers that give lawyers and others instant
access to software allowing statistical analyses to be performed.
Id.
215. See Rubinfeld, supra note 213, at 1048-49.
216. Id.; see also Comment, Judicial Use, Misuse, and Abuse of Statistical Evidence, 47 J.
URB. L. 165 (1970) (discussing the use of statistics in tax, antitrust, and paternity suits).
217. See Note, supra note 211, at 313 (footnote omitted).
218. See Rubinfeld, supra note 213, at 1065.
219. See Note, supra note 211, at 313-14 (footnote omitted); see also Rubinfeld, supra note
213, at 1095 (presenting a two-pronged solution to the problems associated with the use of
statistical data in litigation).
220. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1329, 1372-74 (1971).
221. Id. Although the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States supported the use of statistics in cases in which the existence of discrimination is a
disputed issue, the Court also cautioned that "statistics are not irrefutable; they come in
infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." 431 U.S. 338, 340-41
(1977).
222. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 888 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct
3331 (1986); see also R. WEHMHOEFER, supra note 214, at § 1.02 (discussing the conditions
that favor and disfavor the use of statistical proof); Dawson, supra note 208, at 899.
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tion through the use of statistical evidence provides a valuable comparison with the use of statistics in capital punishment cases.
A.

The Use of Statistics in Litigation
1.

JURY CASES

The Supreme Court has held that it is a denial of fourteenth
amendment equal protection 223 to try a defendant under an indictment issued by a grand jury, or before a petit jury, from which the
state, solely on a racial basis, has excluded all persons of the defendant's race. 224 Racial discrimination in jury selection receives strong
negative reaction in part because courts recognize that such discrimination taints the structure and processes of the criminal justice system. Unless the process of fact finding is entrusted to an impartial
and representative jury, courts have reasoned, the risk of unfairness is
intolerably high 225 and the structural integrity of the court is
compromised.226
The courts fear that discrimination in the criminal justice system
would tend to legitimize the prejudices of society. Jury exclusion
brands the excluded group as inferior, stimulates and perpetuates the
prejudices of society, and facilitates the entrenchment of a vicious
cycle of discrimination.
Early jury selection cases involved the absolute exclusion of an
identifiable group. 227 Later cases established the principle that substantial underrepresentation22 8 of a group constitutes a constitutional
violation if it is the result of purposeful discrimination. 229 To show an

equal protection violation, one must prove that officials employed a
jury selection procedure that resulted in a substantial underrepresentation of the race or identifiable group to which a defendant
223. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
224. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1953).
Section 4 of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, 18 Stat. 336, now codified as 18 U.S.C.
§ 243, affirms and reinforces this constitutional right: "No citizen possessing all
other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law shall be disqualified
for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and whoever,
being an officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or
summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon any citizen for such cause,
shall be fined not more than $5,000."
Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 629 n.8 (1972).
225. Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 723 (5th Cir. 1966).
226. Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617, 624 (1986); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 723
(5th Cir. 1966).
227. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477 (1954).
228. See infra notes 236-46 and accompanying text.
229. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977) (emphasis added).
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belongs. 23 0 This method is known as the "rule of exclusion" and is
available to prove discrimination against a delineated class in jury
selection. 2 ' First, a litigant must establish that the group is one that
is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment
under the laws as written or applied.232 Second, the litigant must
prove the degree of underrepresentation "by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to
serve as . . . jurors, over a significant period of time. ' 233 When a
defendant has shown a substantial underrepresentation of his group, a
prima facie case of discriminatory purpose is established, 234 and the
burden would then shift to the state.235
236 for example, a defendant challenged
In Castaneda v. Partida,
his indictment under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, claiming that officials discriminated against MexicanAmericans in the grand jury selection process.2 37 The defendant
established that Mexican-Americans constituted a clearly identifiable
class.23 s Next, he proved, using statistics, that although the population of the county in question was 79.1% Mexican-American, only
39% of those summoned for grand jury service were Mexican-American. 239 The Court determined that a disparity of 40.1% alone "was
enough to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against Mexi' '2 °
can-Americans in the Hidalgo County grand jury selection.
Because the state failed to rebut the presumption of purposeful discrimination with competent evidence, the Court held that there had
been a denial of equal protection in the process of selecting grand
juries.24 '
The defendant in Alexander v. Louisiana2 42 also used statistical
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 495; see infra note 240.
235. Id.
236. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
237. Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 485-86.
238. Id. at 495.
239. The statistics used were compiled from the 1970 census and the Hidalgo County grand
jury records. Id. at 486.
240. Id. at 496. The Court stated that the disparity fell within the range accepted in
previous cases. Id. In particular, the Court cited Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)
(blacks comprised 27.1% of taxpayers but only 9.1% of grand jury venire); Sims v. Georgia,
389 U.S. 404 (1967) (blacks comprised 24.4% of taxpayers but only 4.7% of grand jury list);
Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967) (19.7% of taxpayers but only 5% of jury list).
241. 430 U.S. at 501.
242. 405 U.S. 625 (1972). In Alexander, a defendant challenged his indictment by the
Lafayette Parish grand jury as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
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evidence to prove systematic exclusion of potential jurors on the basis
of race. Blacks comprised 21.06% of the population of Lafayette Parish eligible for jury service. 43 Yet 6.75% of the group from which the
jury commission drew the grand jury panels, 5% of the petitioner's
grand jury venire, and none of the grand jury members that indicted
the petitioner were black. 244 The Court held that these statistics,
together with a selection procedure that was not racially neutral,245
established a prima facie case of racial discrimination.246
Token summoning of members of an underrepresented group for
jury service does not meet the requirements of the equal protection
clause.24 7 The equal protection clause, however, does not require an

exact proportion between the percentage of the population which the
group comprises and the percentage of the jury list which it comprises. 211 Additionally, an accused is not "constitutionally entitled to
demand a proportionate number of his race [or group] on the jury
which tries him ..

"249

In the context of jury cases, a litigant may use statistical evidence
to establish a presumption of discriminatory intent by demonstrating
the requisite substantial underrepresentation of the race or group to
which the defendant belongs.25° Proof of discriminatory intent is
indispensable in proving a violation of the equal protection clause of
amendment in that the jury selection process systematically excluded potential jurors on the
basis of race.
243. See id. at 627 ("According to 1960 census figures admitted into evidence below,
Lafayette Parish contained 44,986 persons over 21 years of age and therefore presumptively
eligible for grand jury service: of this total, 9,473 persons (21.06%) were Negro.").
244. Id. at 628.
245. The Court observed that questionnaires sent to potential grand jurors for the all-white
Lafayette Parish jury commission included a space to indicate the race of the recipient. Id. at
627. When the respondents returned the questionnaires, the commissioners attached an
information card to each questionnaire noting several things including the recipient's race.
The Court further noted that out of 7374 questionnaires returned to the commission, 1015, or
13.76%, were from blacks. The commissioners "culled out" 5000 questionnaires "ostensibly
on the grounds that these persons were not qualified for grand jury service or were exempted
under state law." Id. Out of the remaining 2000, "400 persons were selected, purportedly at
random, and placed in a box from which the grand jury panels of 20 for Lafayette Parish were
drawn." Id. at 628. The Court mentioned that, according to one technique for calculating
probability, the chances are 1 in 20,000 that only 27 blacks would have been randomly selected
from the 400 member final jury list, when 1015 of the 7374 respondents were black. Id. at 630.
246. Id.
247. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1952).
248. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1964).
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986) (low statistical probability that
chance or accident could have accounted for the exclusion of blacks from the grand jury
during the years at issue).
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the fourteenth amendment.25 '
2.

TITLE VII CASES

"Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin by private
and public employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, and
training programs.

' 252

market. 253

The basic goal of Title VII is to create equality

in the job
This goal is motivated in part by a desire to
ensure that minority groups are not disadvantaged by racially stratified job environments. 25 4 To reach this congressional goal, courts

strive to identify and eliminate arbitrary and discriminatory devices
and practices. 255 Furthermore, the Act operates to invalidate barriers

to employment, regardless of the employer's neutral intentions, if
these barriers invidiously discriminate against minorities. 6 The
court, therefore, may strike down not only overtly discriminatory
practices, but also facially neutral practices that perpetuate the effects
of prior discrimination.25 7
Title VII plaintiffs have used statistical evidence as a major tool
in establishing prima facie cases of discrimination.2 5 8 An inference of

discrimination arises whenever the statistics indicate a likelihood that
the racial or gender composition of the work force did not occur by
chance.259
A Title VII complainant may proceed under one of two distinct
theories-disparate impact or disparate treatment.260 Statistics are

crucial to a plaintiff's case under the disparate impact model at the
prima facie stage.2 6' Under the disparate treatment theory, however,
251. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977).
252. Comment, supra note 216, at 515 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
253. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 126671 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
257. International Bhd of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 349; Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432.
258. Comment, supra note 216, at 516.
259. See id. at 517.
260. In disparate impact cases, the complainant seeks to uncover and eliminate employment
practices that are facially neutral but adversely affect minorities, and are unnecessary to an
employer's legitimate business interests. Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In
disparate treatment cases, the complainant seeks to uncover and eliminate intentional
discrimination. Id. at 1267.
261. Id. at 1269. To establish a prima facie case under the disparate impact test, the
plaintiff must show a substantial disparate impact due to the selection procedure. The
employer then has the burden to establish a business necessity for the challenged procedure. If
no such necessity is shown, the practice is prohibited. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Comment, supra note 216, at 519.
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the litigant introduces statistical evidence at the third or pretextual
stage. The evidence, in the form of summary statistics, is useful only
after the defense has rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case.262
A litigant can often only establish a prima facie case of discrimi-

nation by using statistical evidence to demonstrate the existence of a
disparate impact.2 63 Although a study of selected employment decisions may not reveal a discriminatory pattern in an employer's selection process, a statistical analysis of the employer's work force may
show such a discriminatory pattern.2 64 Racial statistics are often the
clandestine and covert discriminaonly available means of proof of
65
union.
or
employer
an
by
tion
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,266 black employees of the defendant
company challenged the company's policy of requiring employees to
earn a high school diploma and passing grades on intelligence tests in
order to transfer between departments. 6 7 The employees presented:
[North Carolina] census statistics [which] show that, while 34% of
white males had completed high school, only 12% of Negro males
had done so ....
Similarly, with respect to standardized tests, the
EEOC in one case found that use of a battery of tests, including the
Wonderlic and Bennett tests used by the Company in the instant
case, resulted in 58% of whites passing the tests, as compared with
only 6% of the blacks.268

Regardless of the company's lack of discriminatory intent in estabIf an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests are "job
related," it remains open to the complaining party to show that other tests or
selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect, would also serve
the
employer's
legitimate
interest
in "efficient
and
trustworthy
workmanship.
... Such a showing would be evidence that the employer was
using its test merely as a "pretext" for discrimination.
Albemarble Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1974) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973)). In Title VII cases, many courts use a .05 level of significance to infer discrimination. Segar, 738 F.2d at 1282. This indicates that the odds are one in
twenty that the result occurred by chance. Id.
262. Comment, supra note 216, at 517 n.22. Statistics alone are rarely dispositive. To
establish a prima facie case under a disparate treatment theory, a plaintiff must show that "he
belongs to a protected group, he applied and was qualified for a position for which the
employer was seeking applicants, he was rejected, and after his rejection the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications." Id. at
518 n.23 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).

263. Comment, supra note 216, at 520.
264. Id.

265. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 984 (1971).
266. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
267. Id. at 425-26. "The requisite scores used for both initial hiring and transfer
approximated the national median for high school graduates." Id. at 428.
268. Id. at 430 n.6 (citation omitted).
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lishing transfer requirements, the Court held that the company violated the Act by failing to show that such requirements were jobrelated.2 69
In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 270 the
government produced statistical evidence of systemwide discrimination in driver hiring practices. 27 ' Testimony recording over forty specific instances of discrimination bolstered the statistical evidence.27 2
The Court, holding that the government had established a prima facie
case of discrimination, 273 noted that
[s]tatistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a
case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale
sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in
time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial
and ethnic composition of the population in the community from
which employees are hired.2 74
When using statistical data to establish a prima facie case in an
employment discrimination case, it is critical to compare the underrepresented group to the relevant general population.2 7 5 Thus, to
269. Id. at 432-33.
270. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In Teamsters, the government alleged that a common carrier of
motor freight with a nationwide operation and the union representing a large group of its
employees engaged in a pattern and practice of employment discrimination against blacks and
Spanish-surnamed Americans, specifically in the hiring of line drivers.
271. Specifically, the government demonstrated that
[T]he company had 6,472 employees. Of these, 314 (5%) were Negroes and 257
(4%) were Spanish-surnamed Americans. Of the 1,828 line drivers, however,

there were only 8 (0.4%) Negroes and 5 (0.3%) Spanish-surnamed persons, and
all of the Negroes had been hired after the litigation commenced. With one
exception-a man who worked as a line driver at the Chicago terminal from
1950 to 1959-the company and its predecessors did not employ a Negro on a
regularbasis as a line driver until 1969. And, as the Government showed, even in
1971 there were terminals in areas of substantial Negro population where all of
the company's line drivers were white. A great majority of the Negroes (83%)
and Spanish-surnamed Americans (78%) who did work for the company held
the lower paying city operations and serviceman jobs, whereas only 39% of the
nonminority employees held jobs in those categories.
Id. at 337-38 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in the company's Atlanta terminal, no blacks
held line driver positions despite the fact that blacks composed 22.36% of the greater metropolitan population and 51.31% of the city. In the company's two Los Angeles terminals, no
blacks held line driver positions even though blacks composed 10.84% of the greater metropolitan population and 17.88% of the city population. Id. at 337 n.17.
272. Id. at 338. See also Eastland v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 704 F.2d 613, 618 (11 th Cir.
1983).
273. InternationalBhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337.
274. Id. at 340 n.20.
275. Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). In Hazelwood, the
government alleged that the hiring practices of a school district discriminated against blacks.
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establish a presumption of an equal protection violation under the disparate impact model, the litigant may use statistical evidence derived
from multiple regression analysis to prove a substantial disparate
impact of the employment selection procedure.
3.

HOUSING CASES

Litigants may also employ statistics to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination in housing. 7 6 Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act" 7 in an effort to provide fair access to housing throughout the
country.27 A court will find that the defendant engaged in a "pattern
or practice" of discrimination if the litigant establishes that the difference between the racial composition of the pool of prospective purchasers and the racial composition of actual purchasers from or
through an individual or company is statistically significant.2 79 In
addition, such individual or company must have committed at least
one discrete, provable discriminatory act.2 80 Thus, a litigant may use
comparative statistics to prove a violation of the equal protection
clause by showing racial disparity in the pertinent housing market.
4.

SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES

Education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. 28 ' The Court has recognized that denying a child
the opportunity for education may also deny him success in life.282
The Court rejected a comparison of the racial composition of a teacher work force to the
general student population. Id. at 308. "[A] proper comparison was between the racial
composition of Hazelwood's teaching staff and the racial composition of the qualified public
school teacher population in the relevant labor market." Id.; see also Wilkins v. University of
Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 396 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981) ("The seemingly simple and straight
forward task of comparing the number of women hired with the number of women available is
complicated by the fact that the availability component is to a significant extent dependent
upon the subject matter field in which the faculty person is hired.").
276. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
277. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976).
278. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 1974).
279. "A 'significant difference' is one where the likelihood of such a disparity occurring in a
random distribution is less than five per cent." Bogen & Falcon, The Use of RacialStatistics in
Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. REV. 59, 73-74 (1974). "This does not mean that there is a
ninety-five percent chance that the pattern was deliberately created. It means that, assuming
no discrimination, an all-white area would still occur five percent of the time." Id. at 74 n.43.
280. Id. at 73.
281. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
282. For example, the Court noted in Brown that
[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is even greater when it has the
sanction of law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of the child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore,
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The courts have therefore imposed a duty under the fourteenth
amendment upon school systems to desegregate and ensure equal educational opportunities for minority children.
For a litigant to establish a prima facie violation of the equal
protection clause in the school segregation context, he must prove
both historically and statistically that a segregated system 283 presently
exists and that such a system is a result of intentionally discriminatory
state action. 2 4 Because of the difficulty of proving discriminatory
intent, the Court has found it necessary to infer the existence of this
element.2 85 Where a school board has a history of segregative practices 286 and continues to act in a discriminatory manner, the Court
will infer that any present discrimination is the result of a discriminatory intent on the part of the school board. 287 The litigant historically
establishes past discrimination and statistically proves a present discriminatory school system.2 88
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system.
Id. at 494.
283. In Keyes v. School Dist. Number 1, the Court stated that in determining whether a
school is to be considered "segregated," not only must the court examine racial and ethnic
considerations of the school's student body, but it must also consider the composition of the
faculty and staff, and the attitudes of the community and administration toward the schools.
413 U.S. 189, 196 (1973).
284. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) ("[T]o prevail the
plaintiffs were required to 'prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was
brought about or maintained by intentional state action.' ") (quoting Keyes v. School Dist.
Number 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973)).
285. History is a necessary tool in uncovering discriminatory intent because state actors
simply do not announce that their intention in enacting a specific piece of legislation is to
discriminate. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the Court
examined both historical and sociological factors. The Court's historical analysis examined
the status of public education at the time of the enactment of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 489-90. The Court examined sociological factors to reveal "the effect of segregation itself on
public education." Id. at 492. After taking these historical and sociological factors into
account, the Court concluded that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Id. at 495.
286. "[T]o say that a system has a 'history of segregation' is merely to say that a pattern of
intentional segregation has been established in the past." Keyes v. School Dist. Number 1, 413
U.S. 189, 210 (1973).
287. The court stated in Keyes that if a plaintiff proves the existence of a segregated school
district where a statutory dual system was in effect at the time of Brown v. Board of
Education, then the state automatically assumes an obligation to terminate such segregation.
Id. at 200.
The court further stated that even if no statutory dual system existed, a predicate for a
finding of a dual system exists if a plaintiff proves that school authorities effected a " systematic
program of segregation," having a substantial discriminatory result. Id. at 201 (emphasis
added).
288. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 530 n.l (1979). Such statistics
describe racially dominant schools within the school system; see also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
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Once a litigant has established a prima facie case of school discrimination, the burden shifts to the school board to rebut the inference of discriminatory intent or causation. Specifically, the defendant
school board must prove that it did not formulate its policies and
practices in order to "create or maintain segregation, "289 or that such

policies and practices "were not factors in causing the existing condition of segregation in [the] schools."'2 9 The plaintiffs will prevail
unless the school board offers sufficient countervailing evidence.291
The courts have recognized that racial discrimination is a consistent theme in the history of the United States and that it continues to
exist in society today.2 92 Analysis of the jury selection, Title VII,
housing, and school desegregation cases demonstrates that the courts
are striving to move society toward the ideal of a discrimination-free
society. This requires the removal of barriers to minorities in employment,2 93 housing,2 94 and education.2 95 The courts must also root out

discrimination from jury selection and other judicial processes
because such discrimination fosters and legitimizes society's
prejudices.2 96 To reach these goals, the courts have been willing to

employ the admittedly imperfect tool of statistics as proof of discrimination.2 97 The judicial use of statistics and the burden-shifting mechanism ensure that problems of proof do not thwart the courts' goal of
eliminating discrimination in all sectors of society.
B.

Statistics in the Capital Sentencing Context

Although the official discrimination of the pre-Civil War era no
longer exists, discrimination still permeates the legal system.298 Legal
scholars and social scientists have extensively documented the magnitude and pervasiveness of racial discrimination through statistical
studies.2 99 Such studies have concluded that race still plays an active
Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 452 (1979). In Columbus, the plaintiffs offered statistics to show that the
present school system was comprised of 96,000 students, 32% of whom were black.
Approximately 70% of all students attended schools that were at least 80% black or white and
half of the 172 schools were 90% black or white. Id. at 537.
289. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213-14.
290. Id.
291. Brinkman, 443 U.S. at 537.
292. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 252-75 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 281-91 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 208-91 and accompanying text.
298. See Bowers & Pierce, supra note 58, at 595.
299. For a discussion of early studies that examined the subject of racial discrimination in
the criminal justice system, see Brearley, The Negro and Homicide, 9 Soc. FORCEs 247, 252
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role in the prosecution, 3" trial,3" 1 and sentencing30 2 of criminals.
Racial discrimination in capital sentencing is all the more disturbing
because the death penalty is undoubtedly the "ultimate sanction."30 3
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, and notwithstanding that it has
welcomed the use of statistics in proving a variety of claims, 3" the
judiciary has been skeptical of the utility of statistical evidence in capital sentencing challenges. The 1966 case of Maxwell v. Bishop30 5
(1930); Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-RacialHomicides, 27 Soc. FORCES 369,
378-80 (1949); Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELINQ.
132, 141 (1969).
300. Several studies have focused on the relationship between prosecutorial decisions and
race. See Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparityand Jury Packing: Further Challenges to
the Death Penalty, 73 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 385 (1982) ("Blacks accused of killing
whites are twice as likely to have the death penalty requested as are whites accused of killing
blacks."); Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death
Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 783 (1983) ("The effects of
race of victim and geographical area operate independently of one another to produce glaring
disparities in the likelihood of a death request."); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the
Death Penalty The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456, 466-68 (1981) (showing a
relationship between prosecutorial decisions to seek death penalty and the race of offender); cf.
Bentele, supra note 49, at 638 ("The broad, unreviewable discretion of prosecutors, deemed
either not significant for eighth amendment purposes or assumed to be exercised properly by
the Justices in Gregg contributes immeasurably to the risk of arbitrary or discriminatory
imposition of death sentences.") (discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)).
301. Researchers have studied the effects of race at various stages in criminal prosecutions.
See, e.g., Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman
Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1098 (1983) ("[A]rbitrariness is
manifold in its links to race, location within a state, and other personal, situational, and social
influences; pervasive in its presence at various decision points in the handling of capital
cases.").
302. See J. PETERSILIA, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 32
(1983) ("If convicted of felony charges, blacks and Hispanics are more likely than whites to
receive prison sentences."); Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death
Penalty Appeals, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 919 (1983) (showing that in similar
circumstances, in Florida, "black-victim" murder defendants were much less likely than are
"white-victim" defendants to receive death sentences); see also Gibson, Race as a Determinant
of Criminal Sentences. A Methodological Critique and a Case Study, 12 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
455, 475 (1978) (Georgia study showing racial disparity in sentencing is attributable to problack and pro-white predispositions of individual judges, and not to institutional biases);
Spohn, Gruhl & Welch, The Effect of Race on Sentencing: A Re-Examination of an Unsettled
Question, 16 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 71, 86 (1981-82) (study showing that judges discriminate
against black males in deciding whether or not defendants will be incarcerated). For
discussion of quantitative techniques in comparative sentencing litigation, see Baldus, Pulaski,
Woodworth & Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A Quantitative
Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980).
303. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 346 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
304. Chief Justice Burger, recognizing the importance and complexity of the matter,
pointed out that "[t]he case against capital punishment is not the product of legal dialectic, but
rests primarily on factual claims, the truth of which cannot be tested by conventional judicial
processes." Furman, 408 U.S. at 405 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), quoted in Bowers & Pierce,
supra note 298, at 72.
305. 398 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
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illustrates the treatment that the courts have given statistical evidence. In Maxwell, a black petitioner, appealing a death sentence for
the rape of a white woman, introduced into evidence a statistical
study purporting to show that race affected the likelihood of a defendant receiving the death sentence. Specifically, the evidence indicated
that a black man convicted of criminally assaulting a white woman
had approximately a 50% chance of receiving a death sentence,
whereas a man convicted of 'criminally assaulting' a woman of the
same race had about a 14% chance of receiving the death sentence.3 °6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit questioned the integrity of the study 30 7 and ultimately rejected the petitioner's claim under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.30 The court deemed the study and its findings too broad
and thus, inapplicable to the petitioner's particularcase.30 9 In the
court's view, the petitioner failed to show "factually" that his race
caused him "greater or different punishment than a member of
another race."' 310 Bespeaking its implicit skepticism towards the utility of such studies in capital sentencing appeals, the court stated that
it was "not certain that, for Maxwell, statistics [would] ever be his
311
redemption.
From a practical standpoint, the Eighth Circuit's position
presented an insurmountable barrier to proving discrimination in capital sentencing. In most situations, the refusal to consider general statistical studies showing disparate imposition of the death penalty
dooms constitutional challenges to racial discrimination within the
sentencing process. A petitioner will rarely be able to demonstrate
that a sentencer acted with racial discrimination in his particular
306. Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 145 (quoting Maxwell v. Bishop, 257 F. Supp. 710, 719 (E.D.
Ark. 1966)). The study consisted of a survey of rape convictions during the years 1945-65,

sampling nineteen counties in Arkansas. Id. at 141.
307. The court maintained that the study did not relate to the specific county where the
defendant was tried and that it did not take every variable into account. Additionally, the
court stated that the study failed to show that the petit jury in the defendant's case acted with
racial discrimination. Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 146-47.
Surprisingly, however, the court at the same time credited the study as "interesting and
provocative." Id. In addition, the court stated, "We do not say that there is no ground for
suspicion that the death penalty for rape may have been discriminatorily applied over the
decades in that large area of states whose statutes provide for it. There are recognizable
indicators of this." Id. at 148.
308. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
309. Maxwell, 398 F.2d at 147.

310. Id. at 148. The court declared, additionally, that it was "not inclined to accept as
constitutional doctrine an abstraction which provides equality only through assumed and
hoped-for day-to-day practicalities." Id. Furthermore, the court stated, "It is the law, not
probabilities or possibilities, which must afford equal protection." Id.
311. Id.
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The Supreme Court also demonstrated an aversion to statistical
evidence in Gregg v. Georgia.3 " The Court, considering the very same
study of racial discrimination that the Eighth Circuit had rejected in
Maxwell, 31 4 along with other evidence, constitutionally validated the
death penalty in Georgia. Thus, like the Maxwell court, it upheld the
defendant's death sentence despite the proffer of statistical evidence
purporting to show racial discrimination.315
1.

THE RACE-OF-THE-VICTIM APPROACH

Significantly, the defendants in the above cases predicated their
arguments on invidious discrimination against their own race. The
next phase in the evolution of the death penalty appeals was more
innovative and sophisticated by taking into account the race of the
victim.31 6
In Spinkellink v. Wainwright,317 the petitioner introduced evidence that "although the estimated number of black felony murder
victims and white felony murder victims for the years 1973-1976 is
the same, 92% of the inmates on Florida death row had murdered
312. The judiciary again faced statistical evidence of racial discrimination in Furman v.
Georgia, 402 U.S. 238 (1972). This time the forum was the Supreme Court of the United
States. A plurality, in which the Justices wrote nine separate opinions, struck down all death
penalty statutes then in existence. The Court directed that capital juries consider predefined
standards in their deliberations, but paid little attention to the statistics submitted by the
petitioner, which purported to show a racially biased imposition of the death penalty.
Justice Douglas discussed those studies, concluding that: "We cannot say from facts
disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death because they were
black." Id. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas conceded, however, that the state
statutes were "pregnant with discrimination." Id. at 257; cf.id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring)
(concluding that "racial discrimination had not been proved").
Justice Marshall, concurring, observed in contrast to Justices Douglas and Stewart: "It is
immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to
their percentage of the population. Studies indicate that while the higher rate of execution
among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial
discrimination." Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
313. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
314. See Zeisel, supra note 300, at 458.

315. Although the Court did not find the study persuasive, it is interesting that the Solicitor
General of the United States, in his brief supporting the death penalty, stated: "This is a
careful and comprehensive study, and we do not question its conclusion that during the twenty
years in question, in Southern states, there was discrimination in rape cases." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, app. A at 5a, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (No. 746257), quoted in Zeisel, supra note 300, at 458 (footnote omitted). The Solicitor General and
the Court, however, contended that there was no showing of discrimination in the defendant's
particularcase. Zeisel, supra note 300, at 458.
316. See Zeisel, supra note 300, at 456.
317. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
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white victims, while only 8% had murdered black victims." '3 t 8 The
court, however, dismissed this evidence placing emphasis on the
state's contention that "murders involving black victims have, in the
past, generally been qualitatively different from murders involving
white victims."3 9 In addition to offering this explanation for the
questioned the study's accuracy, reliastudy's conclusions, the state
3 20
bility, and methodology.
Although the court tacitly accepted the state's position 2 ' and
assumed the validity of the petitioner's findings, the court ultimately
rejected the petitioner's claim.3 22 Specifically, the court concluded
that the petitioner had failed to show that the death penalty was operating in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of his eighth
amendment right.3 23 The court also rejected the petitioner's fourteenth amendment equal protection claim, asserting that the "discrimination is explainable on nonracial grounds, 3 24 and that the
petitioner had made no showing of any intentionaldiscrimination.3 2 5
Although the court assumed the validity of the statistical study
that the petitioner proffered, the court stated that:
318. Id. at 612.
319. Id. (footnote omitted). Despite the staggering disproportion between those death row
prisoners who had killed whites and those who killed blacks, the state contended that the level
of aggravation present in white-victim murders was generally higher than black-victim
murders. The state testified that "Florida murders involving black victims have in the past
fallen into the category of 'family quarrels, lovers quarrels, liquor quarrels, [and] barroom
quarrels.' " Id. at 612 n.37.
320. Id. at 612.
321. Id. at 612. The court, after discussing the "qualitative" differences between murders
involving black and white victims, stated that: "The petitioner's own expert witness also
testified that factors other than race could have caused the disparate figures, and could single
out no defendant convicted of first degree murder for killing a black who, under the facts and
circumstances of the case, should have received the death penalty instead of life
imprisonment." Id. at 615.
322. Id. at 613.
323. The court further stated, "The allegation that Florida's death penalty is being
discriminatorily applied to defendants who murder whites is nothing more than an allegation
that the death penalty is being imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, a contention we
previously considered and rejected." Id.
The court posited that as long as a capital statute satisfied the requirements of Furman
and Gregg, racial discrimination would not violate the eighth amendment. McCleskey v.
Kemp, however, in effect overrules this section of the opinion. 753 F.2d 877 (11 th Cir. 1985),
cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986). In McCleskey, the court of appeals held that
"Spinkellink can not [sic] be read to foreclose automatically all Eighth Amendment challenges
to capital sentencing conducted under a facially constitutional statute." Id. at 891.
324. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 615.
325. Id. at 615-16. The court cited Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), in
support of its position that an equal protection clause claimant must show intent in order to
prevail on this theory.
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In order to ascertain through federal habeas corpus proceedings if
the death penalty had been discriminatorily imposed upon a petitioner whose murder victim was white, a district court would have
to compare the facts and circumstances of the petitioner's case
with the facts and circumstances of all other Florida death penalty
cases involving black victims in order to determine if the first
degree murderers in those cases were equally or more deserving to
6
die.

32

The court's discussion indicated its unwillingness to undertake the
burden of conducting a proportionality review.127 The burden, how-

ever, appears light because the court considered the study valid.
2.

McCleskey v. Kemp

McCleskey v. Kemp 3 28 represents the first occasion on which
comprehensive statistical evidence of race-of-the-victim discrimination in capital sentencing has reached the Supreme Court of the
United States. An examination of raw data3 29 indicates that Georgia
imposes the death penalty with varying frequency, depending upon
the race of the defendant and the victim. Between the years 1973 and
1979, 1% of black defendants convicted of the murder or voluntary
manslaughter of black victims received the death sentence, while 22%
of those with white victims were sentenced to death.3 30 In murders
involving white defendants and white victims, 8% of the defendants
326. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 613.
327. The Supreme Court of Georgia is required by statute to review each case in which the
death penalty is imposed. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(a) (1982). In its review, the court must
determine "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and defendant." Id. § 17-10-35(c)(3).
The Georgia Code also provides that "[b]oth the defendant and the state shall have the right to
submit briefs within the time provided by the court and to present oral argument to the court."
Id. § 17-10-35(d).
328. Professor David Baldus and his associates compiled the data. See infra note 335 and
accompanying text.
329. Brief for Petitioner, Supplemental Exhibits at 47, McCleskey (No. 84-6811). Out of
2375 cases, 1438 involved blacks who had murdered blacks. Only 18 defendants in these cases
received the death sentence. There were 228 cases involving black defendants and white
victims, and 50 of these defendants received the death sentence. Id.
330. Id. Out of 2375 cases, 58 defendants of the 745 cases that involved white defendants
and white victims received the death sentence. Furthermore, defendants in only 2 of 64 cases
involving white murderers of black victims received the death sentence. Id. The fact that
there were so few cases involving whites murdering blacks may indicate that prosecutorial
decisions to seek the death penalty are related to race. See infra note 335 and accompanying
text.
Additionally, because all decisionmakers in the criminal system exercise discretion at each
stage of the proceedings, discrimination may pervade every facet of the criminal justice system.
The initiation of the criminal process itself-police arrests-allows for the manifestation of
racial bias. See generally Smith, Visher & Davidson, Equity and Discretionary Justice. The
Influence of Race on Police Arrest Decisions, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234 (1984)
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received death sentences.33 '
If one focuses solely on the race of the victim, 11% of white victim cases resulted in the imposition of the death penalty, whereas
defendants were sentenced to death in only 1% of black victim
cases.3 32 Therefore, not only are profound disparities apparent from
evidence on the various racial combinations, but a wide disparity is
also apparent from the evidence on the race of the victim alone. Such
disparities strongly suggest that race is a powerful factor in the decision to sentence a defendant to death. Looking at the unadjusted statistics alone, a layman could easily conclude that racial discrimination
pervades the Georgia capital sentencing system.33 3
In McCleskey, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the "Baldus
Study," which applied multiple regression analysis 334 to examine the
rate of death sentencing in Georgia using the race of the victim and
the defendant as independent variables. 335 The court interpreted the
(Although there is little direct evidence of suspect-directed racial bias in police arrests, police
are more responsive to white victims of crime.).
Moreover, the quantum of discretion afforded to the prosecutor has also elicited criticism.
See Scofield, Due Process in the United States Supreme Court and the Texas Capital Murder
Statute, 8 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 n.48 (1980) ("[I]t is impossible to know what considerations
guided the prosecution ....").
331. Brief for Petitioner, Supplemental Exhibits at 46, McCleskey (No. 84-6811).
332. Justice Marshall, concurring in Furman v. Georgia, indicated that raw data can
provide powerful insight into the operation of a capital sentencing system. In discussing such
data on executions, he stated that "a look at the bare statistics regarding executions is enough
to betray much of the discrimination." 408 U.S. 238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
333. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331
(1986).
334. Multiple regression is a statistical technique used to estimate the impact of two or
more independent variables on a dependent variable. The technique provides a test of the
hypothesis of no relationship between the combined independent variables and the dependent
variables. For discussion of this statistical technique, see N. DRAPER & H. SMITH, APPLIED
REGRESSION ANALYSIS (1981).
335. Dr. David Baldus, Professor of Law at the University of Iowa, a recognized expert on
statistical proof, directed the study. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 352 (N.D. Ga.
1984), rev'd sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 3331 (1986).
Professor Baldus and his associates set out to study data on homicides in Georgia. They
conducted two analyses. The first, known as the Procedural Reform Study, focused on all
offenders in Georgia convicted of murder at a guilt trial. See infra note 57. It also included
several offenders who, after pleading guilty to murder, received the death penalty. The
offenders included were convicted under the Georgia death penalty statute effective on March
28, 1973, and were arrested before June 30, 1978. The universe for the study consisted of
approximately 550 cases, 264 of which were used in the analysis. Researchers gathered
information from case files and government agencies, and coded, or quantified, variables
particular to each case according to a questionnaire which Professor Baldus developed.
After collecting and organizing the data, Baldus and his associates constructed a 200
variable regression model, which attempted to determine the impact of variables, such as race,
on prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty and on the rate of death sentencing.
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study's regression models, which took into account numerous factors,
to indicate that "on average a white victim crime is 6% more likely to
result in the [death] sentence than a comparable black victim
crime. '3 36 In "mid-range" cases, that is, cases in which intermediate
levels of aggravation were present, the court viewed the study as
showing that white-victim defendants stood a 20% higher chance of
33 7
receiving the death penalty than black-victim defendants.
The Eleventh Circuit declined to reject the district court's conclusion that deficiencies in both the data base 331 and the regression
Professor Baldus found the relationship significant in the former, and insignificant in the latter.
The second study, called the Charging and Sentencing Study, was based on a sample of
those in Georgia convicted of murder or voluntary manslaughter whose crimes occurred after
March 28, 1973, and whose arrests occurred before December 21, 1978. The universe for this
study consisted of 2484 cases, of which Professor Baldus included 1084 in the sample.
The researchers revised the questionnaire in this study, making it more comprehensive
than that of the Procedural Reform Study. They coded over 500 variables for each defendant,
including the strength of the prosecutor's case. Professor Baldus, using 230 of these variables,
constructed a regression model from which he drew his primary conclusions. The study
indicated a statistically significant race-of-the-victim effect on the rate of death sentencing.
Specifically, it showed a .06 disparity in the rate of death sentencing attributable to the victim's
race. The disparity was significant at the .02 level.
A 250 variable model, controlling for the effect of Georgia appellate review, indicated .04
disparity attributable to the race-of-the-victim effect. The race-of-the-victim effect was
significant at the .04 level. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 353-55 (N.D. Ga. 1984),
rev'd sub nor. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct.
3331 (1986).
336. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 896. The court observed further that Professor Baldus had
calculated a "death odds multiplier" of 4.3 to 1. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 897. This indicates
"that killing a white victim increases the odds of a death sentence in Georgia by a factor of
4.3." Gross, Race and Death: The JudicialEvaluation of Evidence of Discriminationin Capital
Sentencing, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 1275, 1296 (1985). Moreover, the study indicated that
"blacks who killed whites were sentenced to death at nearly 22 times the rate of blacks who
killed blacks, and more than 7 times the rate of whites who killed blacks." Brief Amici Curiae
for Dr. Franklin M. Fisher, Dr. Richard 0. Lempert, Dr. Peter W. Sperlich, Dr. Marvin E.
Wolfgang, Professor Hans Zeisel & Professor Franklin E. Zimring in Support of Petitioner
Warren McCleskey at 9, McCleskey (No. 84-6811) [hereinafter Brief Amici Curiae for Dr.
Franklin M. Fisher].
337. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 898.
338. The trial court faulted the collection of quantitative information, or data base that
Professor Baldus used in his statistical calculations, stating that "no statistical analysis, much
less a multivariate analysis, is any better than the accuracy of the data base." McCleskey v.
Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 354 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub nom. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d
877 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 3331 (1986). The court found that the
questionnaires used in the study could not "capture every nuance of every case." Id. at 356.
This statement, however, indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the design of
questionnaires. The objective of the design is not to "capture every nuance" of the
phenomenon of interest, but only the critical characteristics.
The court also expressed concern over perceived deficiencies in coding, miscoding in a
substantial number of cases, and a flawed system of recoding. Id. at 355-60. If these assertions
are true, the reliability, or internal consistency in the coding, would be compromised, and the
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models,33 9 and the presence of multi-collinearity 4° rendered the study

fatally defective. Although the Eleventh Circuit apparently did not
find the lower court's judgment on this point clearly erroneous, 34 1 it
held that even if the study were valid, it would still be insufficient to
warrant reversal.34 2
validity of the study as a whole could be brought into question. It appears, however, that the
court's concern on this point was unwarranted. See infra note 357 and accompanying text.
339. The court dismissed the regression models in the Baldus Study on the basis of the
coefficient of determination, "r 2 ," which measures the ."portion of the variance in the
dependent variable (here death-sentencing rate) ... accounted for by the independent variables
included in the model." McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. at 361.
The court found that the r2 value for the 230-variable regression model, reportedly
between .46 and .48, was inconclusive, because the regression equation did "not predict the
outcome in half of the cases." Id. Moreover, the court noted that as "none of the other models
produced by the petitioner [had] an r2 even approaching .5, . . . none of the models are [sic]
sufficiently predictive to support an inference of discrimination." Id.
It is important to point out that these statements fail to interpret accurately the meaning
of r2 . The test is one of significance. If the r2 reaches an acceptable level of significance, then
its exact value is not determinative of whether an inference of discrimination should be drawn.
For further discussion of the analysis of r2, see infra note 359 and accompanying text.
The trial court further found that the regression models used in the Baldus Study assumed
"that all of the information available to the data-gatherers was available to each decisionmaker in the system at the time the decisions were made." Id. The court's argument here is
that the researchers had access to more information than did the sentencer.
This, however, argues for more reliance on a simple, or "restrictive" regression model,
which has fewer variables than the larger, or "full" models. Yet the court would rather have
the full model because it found that the 230-variable model did not include and control for all
relevant variables. See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
Larger models, especially those with hundreds of variables, contain more information
than a sentencer could possibly process. Thus, the "bounded rationality" of the sentencer
precludes consideration of all data included in larger regression equations. The utility of
including such data is, therefore, severely limited.
340. The trial court described multi-collinearity as a distortion occurring when "variables
in an analysis are correlated with one another." McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. at 363. In
the court's opinion, if "there is any degree of interrelationship among the independent
variables, the regression coefficients are somewhat distorted by that relationship and do not
measure exactly the net impact of the independent variable of interest upon the dependent
variable." Id. Specifically, the court found "[a]ll or a big portion of the major nonstatutory
aggravating factors and statutory aggravating factors show positive correlation with both the
death sentencing result and the race of the victim." Id. The court concluded that "[b]ecause of
this it is not possible to say with precision what, if any, effect the racial variables have on the
dependent variable." Id.
341. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 894-95. The court of appeals applied the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review, as it considered the Baldus Study a finding of fact. It stated, "A finding is
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed." McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 894 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364 (1948)).
Although the appellate court's task was to review the trial court's findings concerning the
study under the "clearly erroneous" standard, it chose to use the "even if valid" approach,
thereby implicitly approving the lower court's findings without subjecting them to the requisite
appellate scrutiny.
342. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 895. On this point, the court of appeals stated: "We review
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The court stated that none of the figures that the petitioner proffered were a "definitive quantification" of the impact of race in a particular case.343 Nevertheless, the court asserted that "the figures serve
to enlighten us on how the system operates." 3" In particular, the
court observed that the data set yielding the 6% figure represented "a
composite of all cases and contains both low aggravation cases, where
the penalty is almost never imposed regardless of the victim's race,
and high aggravation cases, where both white and black victim crimes
are likely to result in the penalty. ' 34 5 The figure, therefore, included
many cases in which the sentencer appropriately imposed the death
penalty as well as those cases in which the race of the victim was a
factor.346
Moreover, the court noted that in very simple regression models,
the race-of-the-victim effect greatly contributed to the disparity in the
imposition of the death penalty, but as the researchers added additional variables to the model, the disparity decreased sharply. 347 The
impact, according to the court, ranged from 17% in the very simple
model, utilizing 39 variables,3 48 to 6% in the 230 variable model, and
finally to 4% in the 250 variable model which took into account the
effect of Georgia appellate review.34 9
The 20% disparity figure for cases in the "mid-range" levels of
this finding of fact by assuming the validity of the study and rest our holding on the decision
that the study, even if valid, not only supports the district judge's decision under the clearly
erroneous standard of review, but compels it." Id.
343. Id. at 896.
344. Id.
345. Id. (emphasis added).
346. In low aggravation cases, juries have limited discretion to impose the death penalty,
regardless of the race of the victim, because the level of aggravating circumstances does not
rise to the level at which juries find the penalty warranted. The Baldus Study showed an
average actual sentencing rate of .00 (0/89) in the lowest two of eight levels of aggravation.
McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 922. This indicates a decided absence of sentencer discretion in the
low range. The relevance of this low range to the analysis, therefore, is questionable. See infra
note 363 and accompanying text.
347. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 896. Here the court is arguing simply that multiple regression
may be an unreliable technique for assessing racial disparity. In the simple model (39
variable), the effects of discrimination, if any, may be significant. The court argued, in essence,
that as a researcher adds more relevant independent variables, the apparent impact of the
initial variables may decrease. The extension of this argument is that innumerable variables
impact on the dependent variable, rate of death sentencing.
Adding variables to a regression equation is likely to increase the r2 and decrease the
coefficient of the race-of-the-victim. Nonetheless, the court should examine each variable in
terms of its contribution to the explained variance and the reduction in the error term. As a
general rule, regression models with fewer variables are preferable to models with innumerable
variables.
348. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. at 375.
349. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 896.
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aggravation presented a more difficult problem for the court to
resolve. As in its analysis of the 6% disparity, the court expressed
doubt about the figure's validity. The court stated that the 20% figure
represented a disparity in the death sentencing rate that Dr. Baldus
had not conclusively demonstrated to be a function of the victim's
race.3 10 The court, in addition, argued that the "mid-range" was not
a "well-defined" class of cases and was not representative of the universe of cases involving the death 35sentence such as to depict accurately the race of the victim effect. '

Assuming the validity of the 20% figure, the court stated that "a
disparity only in the mid-range cases, and not in the system as a
whole, cannot provide the basis for a system-wide challenge. "352
Even though McCleskey's crime fell within the "mid-range," the
court did not find the 20% disparity figure persuasive.353 The court
concluded that "[t]he statistics alone [were] insufficient to show that
McCleskey's sentence was determined by the race of his victim, or
even that the race of his victim contributed to the imposition of the
penalty in his case."'3 54 Under McCleskey, a showing of disparate
350. Additionally, the court mentioned that the Baldus testimony did not include a
statement that the 20% figure was statistically significant. Id. at 898.
351. Id. Although the court did not fully address this issue, it rejected the claim that a
system which produces a 20% disparity violates the eighth amendment. The court stated that
"the system as a whole is operating in a rational manner, and not in a manner that can fairly be
labeled arbitrary or capricious." Id. As to the equal protection claim, the court stated that
"the statistics cannot show that the race-of-the-victim factor operated in a given case, even in
the mid-range." Id.
352. Id. This position, however, is not entirely a logical one. As the court itself mentioned,
while sentencers seldom impose the death penalty in low aggravation cases, sentencers are far
more likely to impose it in high aggravation cases. In both instances, according to the Baldus
Study, race plays a smaller role than in the cases that fall between these two poles. In these
"mid-range" cases, the chances of discrimination are greatly increased because the sentencer's
discretion is at its highest point. The court's narrow view of the significance of the "midrange" challenge ignores the fact that if discrimination occurs at all, it is likely to be in the
"mid-range" cases.
Furthermore, the court seems to have concluded that even if a much higher race-of-thevictim disparity in mid-range cases existed, this would present no basis for invalidation of the
penalty in its entirety. This approach, in effect, has neutralized a litigant's ability to challenge
racism which, while seriously infecting a capital sentencing system, has not pervaded the
system at every possible level.
353. Id. at 897-98.
354. Id. The court insisted that the petitioner's evidence did not indicate discrimination in
his particular case, and that even if systemic discrimination could be shown, it would not
necessarily require the invalidation of the petitioner's death sentence.
The court took this position because it viewed the petitioner's eighth and fourteenth
amendment challenges as requiring largely the same proof. That is, "where racial
discrimination is claimed, not on the basis of procedural faults or flaws in the structure of the
law, but on the basis of decisions made within that process, then purpose, intent and motive
are a natural component of the proof that discrimination actually occurred." Id. at 892 (citing
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp, 429 U.S. 252
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impact alone is insufficient to support a constitutional claim of discrimination, unless it compels a "conclusion that the system is
unprincipled, irrational, arbitrary and capricious such that purposeful
'
discrimination ... can be presumed to permeate the system."355
The
court's opinion, however, conspicuously lacked guidance on the magnitude of the disparity that would compel an inference of discriminatory intent.3 56
3.

THE CREDIBILITY OF THE OPINION

In the opinions of the district court and the court of appeals, the
Baldus Study did not accurately reflect the relationship between race
and death sentencing in Georgia. The district court, in particular,
objected to Baldus's method of coding variables and accounting for
missing data, 35 7 and asserted that the study failed to include and control for the appropriate variables in the regression models. 5 Additionally, the district court disputed Baldus's interpretation of the r'
value3 59 and the effect of multi-collinearity 6 ° Such objections, how(1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), for the proposition that a petitioner
must prove discriminatory intent, in the context of a fourteenth amendment equal protection
claim, even after a showing of disparate impact).
355. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 892. Addressing the disparity issue, given its existence in the
system, the court ruled that a discretionary system necessarily entails "some imprecision." Id.
at 897-98; see also McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (holding that a jury may
constitutionally exercise untrammelled discretion in the imposition of the death penalty in
capital cases).
The exercise of discretion, according to the McCleskey court, "means that persons
exercising discretion may reach different results from exact duplicates." McCleskey, 753 F.2d
at 898. Because the McCleskey court mischaracterized the 6% differential as "marginal," it
demanded that the petitioner prove that the disparity was a function of racial bias. Id. at 899.
356. The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the disparity figures clearly was misguided. It
seems, therefore, that a proper interpretation of the disparity figures might have compelled the
court to draw an inference of discriminatory intent. See infra notes 365-70 and accompanying
text.
357. Judge Johnson, dissenting from the Eleventh Circuit's affirmance of the district court's
decision, stated, "Several of the imperfections noted by the district court were not legally
significant because of their minimal effect." McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 915 (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). He further stated that "[t]he race of the victim was uncertain in 6% of the cases at
most; penalty trial information was unavailable in the same percentage of cases. The relatively
small amount of missing data, combined with the large number of variables used in several of
the models, should have led the court to rely on the study." Id. (footnotes omitted).
358. The district court took the position that the study's regression models did not include
all of the relevant variables. In Bazemore v. Friday, however, the Supreme Court indicated
that multiple regression evidence need only include the major variables. 106 S. Ct 3000 (1986).
359. The trial court concluded that the r 2 measurement rendered the 230-variable
regression model invalid. Judge Johnson, dissenting in the court of appeals opinion, pointed
out that the court "based that finding on the fact that a model with an r 2 less than .5 'does not
predict the outcome in half of the cases.' " McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 917 n.27. He stated
further, "This is an inaccurate statement, for an r 2 actually represents the percentage of the
original Il -to-I differential explained by all the independent variables combined. A model
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ever, are tenuous.361

In addition to these shortcomings in both courts' analyses, they
were mistaken in the belief that the 6% disparity was inflated, rather
than underestimated.

The 6% figure is a composite of all cases

including those in the low aggravation range.3 62 The effect of including low range cases in the regression analysis, however, would tend to
reduce the regression coefficient, because the average actual sentenc-

ing rate for the lower two of eight levels of aggravation was zero.
Approximately 19% of the cases fell within this range.3 63
The discretion of a sentencer is effectively limited in the low
aggravation range because the level of aggravating circumstances does
not rise to the level where the sentencer imposes the death penalty.
The low range cases, absent sentencer discretion, are of little consequence to the determination of the existence of systemic racial discrimination. Yet, cases in this range are still reflected in the
composite.
More significantly, the court of appeals's interpretation of
another aspect of the 6% disparity figure demonstrates a critical lack
of statistical expertise. The court viewed this figure as a percentage
increase in the rate of sentencing attributable to the race of the victim.
A 6% increase in the likelihood of a defendant receiving the death
sentence did not appear egregious to the court, as evidenced by the
court's refusal to reverse the decision of the district court. 3 4

If one properly interprets the disparity figure, however, it repre2
with an r of less than .5 would not necessarily fail to predict the outcome in half the cases
because the model improves upon pure chance as a way of correctly predicting an outcome.
For dichotomous outcomes (i.e., the death penalty is imposed or it is not), random predictions
could succeed half the time." Id.
360. It is doubtful that the effects of multi-collinearity were so significant as to justify
invalidating the results of the study. Experts testified that multi-collinearity decreases the
standard deviation of the regression coefficients, which in turn reduces the statistical
significance. McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 364 (N.D. Ga. 1984), rev'd sub nom.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877 (1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct. 3331 (1986). The
result is a dampening of the effect of the racial variable. Id. The conclusion of this argument is
that the "6%" figure is actually an underestimateof the racial discrimination operating in the
capital sentencing system.
361. See supra notes 357-360.
362. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 896.
363. Out of 472 cases, covering 8 levels of aggravating circumstances, 89, or 19%, fell
within the two lowest levels. Of these cases, none received the death sentence. Out of the total
number of cases, 116, or 25%, received the death sentence. Id. at 922 (Hatchett, J., dissenting
in part, concurring in part).
364. The figure, even as interpreted by the court, still raises serious questions as to
constitutional tolerance because the likelihood of a death sentence would be increased based on
an illegitimate consideration. That is, a person's race would be a factor which demonstrably
impacts on the likelihood of a death sentence. Allowing for a constitutionally acceptable level
of consideration of constitutionally impermissible factors is a contradiction in terms.
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sents a six percentage point increase in the rate of sentencing.36 5 As
previously discussed, the death sentencing rate in white victim cases is
11%. The regression model used in the Baldus Study indicated that
the overall rate in comparably aggravated black-victim cases is 5%,
which reveals the six percentage point differential.3 66 If the six percentage point disparity exists in fact, then "at the average level of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances represented by the whitevictim cases, the rate of capital sentencing in a white-victim case is
120% greater than the rate in a black-victim case."'3 67 Stated another
way, the defendant is 2.2 times more likely to receive the death penalty if the victim is white as opposed to black. This would mean that
for "six out of every 11 death penalty cases in which the victim was
white, race-of-victim was a determining aggravating factor in the
sense that the defendants would not have received the death penalty if
the victims had been black. 31 68 Additionally, in the case of the 20%
disparity in "mid-range" cases, there would be a 139% increase in the
rate of capital sentencing.169 A "mid-range" defendant, therefore, is
2.4 times more likely to receive the death sentence if his victim is
white rather than black. In this case, it would mean that "out of
every 34 death-penalty cases in the mid-range in which victims were
white, 20 defendants would not have received the death penalty if
37 °
their victims had been black.
Not only did the Eleventh Circuit misunderstand the statistics, 3 7'
but it also affirmed the lower court after giving only cursory treatment
to its findings of fact, notwithstanding the lower court's misconstruction of the study.3 72 To justify its reluctance to engage in an
365. Brief Amici Curiae for Dr. Franklin M. Fisher, supra note 336, at 17.
366. Id. at 18.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 19.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Another possible defect in the court's opinion is its implied analogy between the 6%
figure and the disparities in jury selection cases. In Swain v. Alabama, a leading jury selection
case, the Court viewed a showing of a 10% disparity in representation as insufficient to
establish a claim of discrimination. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). The McCleskey court apparently
viewed this as support for its rejection of the 6% figure. This analogy, however, is ill-formed.
The 10% figure indicated a ten point disparity in rate of representation, while in the
McCleskey case, the 6% figure indicated a disparity in the rate of selection. The figures,
therefore, measure disparities entirely different in kind. A direct comparison of the two
measures would be misleading. Gross, supra note 336, at 1298.
372. Alternatively, the court of appeals reviewed the decision of the district court under an
analysis assuming the validity of the study. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 895. Thus, the court may
not only have been unwilling to analyze the data, but apparently was not averse to
emasculating future statistical challenges in advance.
Another possible explanation for the courts' treatment of the Baldus Study may be a lack
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independent analysis of the data, the court invoked the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 73 It appears, however, that the court may
have been predisposed to reject the statistical evidence. In the court's
opinion, "[g]eneralized studies would appear to have little hope of
excluding every possible factor that might3 make
a difference between
74
crimes and defendants, exclusive of race."

Due to the quality of the Baldus Study, the McCleskey decision
may have particularly significant implications. By declining to disturb the invalidation of one of the most ambitious and comprehensive
studies of racial bias,375 the McCleskey court may have implicitly set
an unattainable standard of methodology for proving racial discrimiof judicial expertise in statistics. See generally Kaye, StatisticalEvidence of Discrimination, 77
J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 773 (1982) (criticizing the courts' lack of expertise in handling
statistics); Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1080 (1966)
(problems in the transmission of technical information to the courts); cf.Lempert, Statistics in
the Courtroom: Building on Rubenfield, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1098 (1985) (statisticians and
attorneys need to learn more about the proper use of statistics and the law); Comment, supra
note 216 (attorneys and judges often lack the mathematical skills and inclinations to use
statistics properly and attorneys often lay improper foundations for statistical evidence).
Because statistical evidence is often complicated, confusing, highly technical, and capable
of multiple interpretations, considerable expertise is required. For a discussion of statistical
techniques used in discrimination cases, see D. BALDUS, STATISTICAL PROOF OF
DISCRIMINATION

(1980).

It cannot be denied that inaccuracies in statistical studies do sometimes exist. See
generally Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980)

(studies often do not control for additional variables or for the relationship between variables,
and experts often do not elucidate the hypotheses of their models); Tribe, supra note 220
(statistics carry a high risk of misuse, and mathematical devices sometimes destroy societal

values in trial conduct); Note, supra note 211 (mistakes made in the planning stages may
invalidate statistical studies).
The inherent fallibility of statistics, perceived or actual, may have provided impetus to the
courts' rejection of the Baldus Study. Scholars have frequently examined the attitudes of the
judiciary and lawyers toward statistical evidence. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 208 (problems
created by judicial attitudes toward the role of statisticians as expert witnesses); Hallack, The
Numbers Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 VILL. L. REV.
5 (1977) (inherent limitations in the probative value of statistics have created an environment
of judicial caution); Wilson, The Use of Statistics and Statisticiansin the Litigation Process, 20
JURIMETRICS J. 109 (1979) (mistrust of statistics and awareness of potential for misuse and
distortion have led the courts to limit the use of statistics). The courts' distaste for the abuses
of statistics, however, does not provide a satisfactory or conscionable explanation for the
outright rejection of statistical evidence of racial bias in capital sentencing.
373. Review under the "clearly erroneous" standard may actually bring about opposite
results in future cases. If trial courts find studies valid, appellate courts, predisposed toward
rejecting such findings, will have difficulty doing so.
374. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 894.
375. Experts have characterized the Baldus Study as "far and away the most complete
analysis of sentencing" ever carried out. McCleskey, 753 F.2d at 907-08 n.l (Johnson, J.,
dissenting in part, concurring in part) (quoting Dr. Richard Berk, member of the panel of the
National Academy of Sciences charged with reviewing and developing standards for criminal
sentencing research).
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nation in capital sentencing. If the court did not consider this study
valid and reliable, then, in essence, the court may have effectively precluded the introduction of all empirical evidence of such discrimination.
V.

CONCLUSION

If people are sentenced to death based upon their race or the race
of their victims, their executions must be considered grave injustices,
made more unjust by judicial indifference. Criminal defendants
should not live or die because of the color of their victims, anymore
than they should live or die because of their own color. If McCleskey
is right, then Georgia, by the unspoken racial animus of its prosecutors, judges, and juries, has made race a "silent" aggravating circumstance in death sentencing. The Supreme Court has stated that to do
so overtly would be impermissible,376 and Georgia should not be permitted to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
It may be true that racial discrimination is deeply, if not inextricably, rooted in the subconscious of our society. Judges may despair
of ever finding a way to prevent sentencers, in the necessary exercise
of their discretion, from considering race in the sentencing decision.
This does not justify fixing a constitutional seal of approval upon such
a repugnant practice, especially in a context as severe as death
sentencing.
Courts should not take formal account of race hatred simply
because it exists.377 This is a core principle of equal protection, and is
no less applicable to a death sentencing system than to a judge's childcustody decision,378 or to a city council's zoning ordinance.37 9 Judges
should not be permitted to throw up their hands when solutions are
difficult: the Court should not approve a sentencing system that
metes out a higher penalty for killing a white man rather than a black
man. To do so, in effect, would resurrect the despised Black Codes,3"'
in a subtle, but unconvincing disguise.
In deciding McCleskey, the Supreme Court must come to terms
with the apparently contradictory goals of eliminating arbitrariness
376. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (If "Georgia attached the 'aggravating'
label to factors that are constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing
process, such as ... the race ... of the defendant.., due process of law would require that the

jury's decision to impose death be set aside.").
377. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985); Palmore v. Sidotti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984).
378. Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).

379. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
380. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussion of the Black Codes).
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and preserving a death sentencing system that permits human discretion. The Eleventh Circuit attempted to protect the "new" death penalty by making McCleskey's claim impossible to prove. In light of the
severity and irreversibility of the death penalty, this solution is, at
best, disingenuous, and at worst, constitutionally intolerable.
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